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STUART MINOR BENJAMIN† 
One of the central questions in free speech jurisprudence is what activities the 
First Amendment encompasses. This Article considers that question in the context of 
an area of increasing importance—algorithm-based decisions. I begin by looking to 
broadly accepted legal sources, which for the First Amendment means primarily 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. That jurisprudence provides for very broad First 
Amendment coverage, and the Court has reinforced that breadth in recent cases. 
Under the Court’s jurisprudence the First Amendment (and the heightened scrutiny it 
entails) would apply to many algorithm-based decisions, specifically those entailing 
substantive communications. We could of course adopt a limiting conception of the 
First Amendment, but any nonarbitrary exclusion of algorithm-based decisions would 
require major changes in the Court’s jurisprudence. I believe that First Amendment 
coverage of algorithm-based decisions is too small a step to justify such changes. But 
insofar as we are concerned about the expansiveness of First Amendment coverage, 
we may want to limit it in two areas of genuine uncertainty: editorial decisions that 
are neither obvious nor communicated to the reader, and laws that single out speakers 
but do not regulate their speech. Even with those limitations, however, an enormous 
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and growing amount of activity will be subject to heightened scrutiny absent a 
fundamental reorientation of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
More and more of our activity involves not merely the transmission of 
bits, but the transmission of bits according to algorithms and protocols 
created by humans and implemented by machines.1 Messages travel over the 
Internet because of transmission protocols, coding decisions determine the look 
and feel of websites, and algorithms determine which links, messages, or stories 
rise to the top of search engine results and web aggregators’ webpages. Most 
webpages have automated components, as do most online articles and all 
video games.2 Are these algorithm-based outputs “speech” for purposes of 
the First Amendment?3 That is, does the Free Speech Clause of the First 
 
1 I am using “bit” as a convenient shorthand for information transmitted via electronic signals. 
In computing and telecommunications, data is encoded in binary digits (a.k.a. bits), but nothing in 
this Article turns on the binary nature of bits per se. The point is simply to emphasize the nature 
of the communication as electronic, as opposed to old-fashioned pen or printing press on paper. 
2 The list goes on and on. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW 
ALGORITHMS CAME TO RULE OUR WORLD 7 (2012) (“Algorithms have already written 
symphonies as moving as those composed by Beethoven, picked through legalese with the deftness 
of a senior law partner, diagnosed patients with more accuracy than a doctor, written new articles 
with the smooth hand of a seasoned reporter, and driven vehicles on urban highways with far 
better control than a human.”). 
3 The First Amendment encompasses more than the Free Speech Clause, of course. For the 
purposes of this Article, when I refer to the First Amendment I am referring to its Free Speech 
Clause component. 
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Amendment apply to government regulation of these or other algorithm-
based changes to bits?4 
In this Article I address that question. I conclude that if we accept Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, the First Amendment encompasses a great swath of 
algorithm-based decisions—specifically, algorithm-based outputs that entail 
a substantive communication. We could decide to reject Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, or read it narrowly in order to limit its application. But for 
the purposes of this Article, I will not apply that lens to the existing case 
law. Instead, I will look to broadly accepted sources and forms of legal 
reasoning—which in the First Amendment context means primarily 
Supreme Court jurisprudence—and consider whether those sources lead to 
the conclusion that algorithm-based outputs are speech for First Amendment 
purposes. I find that the answer is yes for most algorithm-based editing. 
For some, this answer will be unwelcome. A wide range of commentators 
have expressed concerns about potentially expansive interpretations of the 
scope of the Free Speech Clause, such that much, if not most, government 
regulation is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.5 Such a concern may 
motivate, at least in part, the contrasting answer that Tim Wu reaches in his 
piece.6 One possible response to these concerns is to articulate a theory of 
the Free Speech Clause that excludes algorithm-based decisions, or, perhaps 
more modestly, search engine results (which have been the focus of some 
 
4 There is no single accepted definition of “algorithm.” See Algorithm Characterization, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithm_characterizations (last updated Feb. 11, 2013) 
(stating that an “[a]lgorithm does not have a generally accepted formal definition” and discussing 
more than twenty different prominent characterizations). Broadly speaking, an algorithm is a set 
of instructions designed to produce an output. My use of the term in this Article focuses on its 
most common usage—as instructions or rules implemented by a computer. That is, I want to focus 
on nonhuman processes, and I use the term “algorithm” to refer to them. For ease, I will refer to 
decisions made by protocols, algorithms, and other computations as algorithm-based decisions. I 
could call them “code-based processes” or some other less-familiar and more ungainly term, but I 
choose “algorithm” simply because it has become more familiar shorthand. 
5 See generally Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 449, 449-66 (1985); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: 
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 14-25 (1979); Jedediah Purdy, The 
Roberts Court v. America, DEMOCRACY, Winter 2012, at 46, 49-53. The work of Frederick Schauer 
has been especially important in this regard. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the 
First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1794-
95 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, Boundaries]; Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: 
New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285; Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the 
Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1988); Frederick Schauer, First 
Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT 174 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone 
eds., 2002). 
6 See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1498 ( 2013) (“Too much protection would 
threaten to constitutionalize many areas of commerce and private concern without promoting the 
values of the First Amendment.”). 
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commentators).7 Any such exclusion, however, will entail a radical revamping 
of our Free Speech Clause jurisprudence. And, as it turns out, there are 
interpretations that are consistent with existing jurisprudence (and, in my 
view, desirable on their own terms) that would limit the scope of the Free 
Speech Clause. Of course, one could find those interpretations insufficient, 
but I conclude that the inclusion of algorithm-based decisions in the First 
Amendment’s protections does not substantially advance the argument for a 
radical revamping. 
In a previous article I asked how difficult it would be to find that mere 
transmission of bits constituted speech.8 One way of framing that question 
is to ask how hard it would be to expand the definition of speech to include 
something (mere transmission) that ordinarily would fall outside it. In this 
Article I address the converse question: How hard would it be to narrow the 
definition of speech to exclude something that Supreme Court jurisprudence 
would encompass? What would such an exclusion mean for First Amend-
ment jurisprudence? 
I. WHAT IS AT STAKE 
A huge range of bit manipulations involves the use of algorithms. Com-
puter code is a set of instructions and algorithms.9 Every webpage relies on 
many different algorithms for its structure, not to mention its transmission 
over the Internet. Indeed, every networked device depends on an electronic 
network built in part on algorithms. 
Around the turn of this century, there was considerable focus on whether 
computer code itself was speech for First Amendment purposes, such that 
regulations on the distribution of code implicated the First Amendment.10 
 
7 See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1193-1201 & n.239 (2008) (contending 
that the First Amendment, properly understood, does not cover search engine rankings). 
8 Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining What “The 
Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1695 (2011) (concluding that “argument that 
transmission qua transmission triggers the First Amendment is . . . weak”). 
9 See generally Algorithm, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithm (last updated Mar. 
29, 2013); What Is a Computer Algorithm?, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks. 
com/question717.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
10 See, e.g., Steven E. Halpern, Harmonizing the Convergence of Medium, Expression, and Func-
tionality: A Study of the Speech Interest in Computer Software, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 139, 181 (2000) 
(discussing the application of the First Amendment to computer software); Robert Post, 
Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2000) 
(discussing whether encryption source code is covered by the First Amendment); Schauer, 
Boundaries, supra note 5, at 1794 (“The anti-Microsoft and anti-Hollywood claims of the open-
source movement focus on the way in which computer source codes can be conceived of as a 
language and therefore as speech . . . .”); Katherine A. Moerke, Note, Free Speech to a Machine? 
Encryption Software Source Code Is Not Constitutionally Protected “Speech” Under the First Amendment, 
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The government had concerns about the proliferation of some computer 
programs (notably, those perceived as jeopardizing security), and it sought 
to regulate the circulation of the code itself—the instructions to a computer 
that would enable the feared activity.11 For what it is worth, the few courts 
that considered the issue found by and large that regulations of computer 
code were regulations of speech.12 
My focus here is not on the distribution of code, and thus not on whether 
code itself is speech. Rather, I consider whether the outputs of that code—
the decisions created by algorithms—are speech for First Amendment 
purposes. The question whether the First Amendment applies to regulation 
of search engine results is different from the question whether the algo-
rithms used by those search engines are speech. Even if the algorithms are 
not speech, their products may be. 
What sorts of regulations of algorithm-based decisions might be at issue? 
The most prominent possibility, and the one that has inspired the most 
commentary, is the regulation of search engine results, and in particular 
(given its large market share) Google. A company frustrated by its low 
PageRank (which hurt its ability to find clients) brought an action against 
Google for tortious interference with contractual relations, and Google 
successfully argued that the First Amendment applied to its search results.13 
Another company frustrated by its rankings on Google unsuccessfully 
argued that Google’s search engine is an “essential facility” that must be 
 
84 MINN. L. REV. 1007, 1027 (2000) (“[B]ecause source code is the implementation of an idea, not 
the expression of it, it is not entitled to First Amendment protection as a type of speech.”).  
11 The government has acted on these concerns on a number of occasions by restricting the 
distribution or export of computer software that it viewed as dangerous on a number of occasions, 
producing several lawsuits. See, e.g., Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000) (export of 
excryption software programs); Bernstein v. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(distribution of encryption software pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations); 
Karn v. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996) (designation of a computer diskette as a 
“defense article” pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations).  
12 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 447 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
the First Amendment covers computer programs, and stating that “[a] recipe is no less ‘speech’ 
because it calls for the use of an oven, and a musical score is no less ‘speech’ because it specifies 
performance on an electric guitar”); Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1141 (concluding that “encryption software, 
in its source code form and as employed by those in the field of cryptography, must be viewed as 
expressive for First Amendment purposes”), reh’g en banc granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 
1308 (9th Cir. 1999). 
13 Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *3-4 (W.D. 
Okla. May 27, 2003) (order granting Google’s motion to dismiss). “PageRank” is an algorithm that 
“measure[s] . . . the quantity and quality of links from one website to another.” Victor T. Nilsson, 
Note, You're Not from Around Here, Are You? Fighting Deceptive Marketing in the Twenty-First 
Century, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 807 (2012); see also PageRank, WIKIPEDIA, http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/PageRank (last updated Apr. 6, 2013). 
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opened to access,14 and Frank Pasquale argued that Google should be 
understood as a new kind of bottleneck deserving of regulatory attention—
an “essential cultural and political facility.”15 Pasquale and Oren Bracha 
have also argued that the government should be able to regulate search 
engines’ ability to structure their results, and that the First Amendment 
does not encompass search engine results.16 Eugene Volokh and Donald 
Falk, by contrast, have contended that all aspects of search engines’ results 
are fully protected by the First Amendment.17  
But, at least for some commentators, the concern is not limited to 
Google. For instance, Tim Wu has suggested that the important issue is 
computer-generated outcomes more generally. Wu has contended that 
“nonhuman or automated choices” should not be treated as speech for First 
Amendment purposes.18 This framing is useful. Under the prevailing 
jurisprudence, the existence of anticompetitive concerns with respect to 
Google (or any other particular entity) might affect the application of First 
 
14 Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 06-2057, 2007 WL 831806, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 16, 2007) (granting motion to dismiss) (“KinderStart asserts that the Google search engine is 
‘an essential facility for the marketing and financial viability of effective competition in creating, 
offering and delivering services for search over the Internet.’” (citation omitted)). 
15 Frank Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural & Political Facility, in THE 
NEXT DIGITAL DECADE 401, 402 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010), available at http:// 
nextdigitaldecade.com/ndd_book.pdf. 
16 See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7; see also Jennifer A. Chandler, A Right to Reach an 
Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1117 (2007) 
(stating that in light of websites’ free speech “right to reach an audience, and the listener’s right to 
choose among speakers according to the listener’s own criteria, free of extraneous discriminatory 
influences[,] . . . search engines should not manipulate individual search results except to address 
instances of suspected abuse of the system”). 
17 See EUGENE VOLOKH & DONALD M. FALK, FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR 
SEARCH ENGINE SEARCH RESULTS (2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf. Volokh and Falk state that 
Google, Microsoft’s Bing, Yahoo! Search, and other search engines are speakers. First, 
they sometimes convey information that the search engine company has itself prepared 
or compiled (such as information about places appearing in Google Places). Second, 
they direct users to material created by others, by referencing the titles of Web pages 
that the search engines judge to be most responsive to the query, coupled with short 
excerpts from each page. . . . Third, and most valuably, search engines select and sort 
the results in a way that is aimed at giving users what the search engine companies see 
as the most helpful and useful information. 
Id. at 3. James Grimmelmann has taken a more nuanced position, focusing on search engines as 
advisors to their users. See James Grimmelmann, Search Engines as Advisors (2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
18 Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2012, at A29 (“[A]s a general 
rule, nonhuman or automated choices should not be granted the full protection of the First 
Amendment, and often should not be considered ‘speech’ at all.”). I understand Wu to be making 
a different argument in his contribution to this Symposium, and I discuss it briefly in note 84, 
infra. 
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Amendment scrutiny but not whether the underlying activity is encom-
passed by the First Amendment in the first place. 
The apparent motivation behind excluding algorithm-based decisions 
from First Amendment coverage is understandable. More and more of our 
activity involves bits, and those bits are frequently guided and shaped by 
algorithms. The more fully algorithm-based decisions are treated as speech, 
the more broadly First Amendment jurisprudence will apply. And this has 
real consequences. Content-based government regulations of speech are 
subject to strict scrutiny, which is very difficult to satisfy.19 Content-neutral 
regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which is an easier test to 
pass but still much more rigorous than the rational basis review applicable 
to ordinary regulation.20 
Heightened scrutiny raises the costs of regulation, both in requiring 
more justification ex ante and in increasing the likelihood that the regulation 
will be rejected on constitutional grounds (since the chances of rejection on 
constitutional grounds for ordinary legislation are near zero). It could be 
that we, as a society, like this outcome because we decide that we want less 
government regulation of algorithm-related industries, but my point here is 
simply that we disincentivize regulation when heightened scrutiny applies. 
Subjecting every regulation that affects algorithm-based transmissions to 
intermediate scrutiny would have dramatic consequences. 
Consider the Court’s recent opinion in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,21 
which involved a Vermont law restricting the sale, disclosure, and use of 
pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors, 
as a way of thwarting data miners’ perceived invasion of privacy.22 Such a 
law would be unproblematically constitutional absent First Amendment 
coverage. That is, if it were understood not to trigger First Amendment 
scrutiny, it would easily pass constitutional muster. But, the Supreme Court 
 
19 See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government 
may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling 
interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”). Only one 
speech regulation has survived strict scrutiny in the Supreme Court. See Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) (upholding a federal statute making it a crime to 
“knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization” in light of 
the particular deference due to the Executive regarding the combating of terrorism (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006))). 
20 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (“[A] content-
neutral regulation will be sustained if ‘it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.’” (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))). 
21 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
22 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010). 
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flatly stated in Sorrell that “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is 
a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment. As a consequence, Vermont’s statute must be subjected to 
heightened judicial scrutiny. The law cannot satisfy that standard.”23 
Similarly, the FCC’s limits on the horizontal concentration and vertical 
integration of cable companies would be subject to fairly lenient review if 
applied to distributors of gas or electricity. But because the D.C. Circuit 
found that these regulations implicated the First Amendment and thus 
triggered intermediate scrutiny, the court invalidated the regulations and 
remanded them.24 Even after that remand, and a much more detailed 
analysis by the FCC, the D.C. Circuit found that the FCC had failed to 
justify the numbers it had chosen and thus rejected them again.25 Those 
limits—which are statutorily mandated, by the way—lie dormant. The FCC 
has not figured out how to write regulations that will survive heightened 
First Amendment scrutiny. 
II. THE CENTRALITY AND EXPANSION OF 
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
A. A Note on Broadly Accepted Sources and Forms of Reasoning 
In this Article I want to apply broadly accepted sources and forms of 
legal reasoning. In the First Amendment context, that means primarily 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. This is fairly well-trodden ground, and my 
focus here is not to defend that proposition. I will simply note that, as a 
textual matter, “speech” and “the freedom of speech” could be interpreted 
in any number of ways. Everyone might agree on some core elements, but 
the textual boundaries of these terms are not apparent.26 And as Leonard 
 
23 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659. 
24 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1137, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
25 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
26 Akhil Amar has argued that intratextualism—identifying terms appearing in different 
parts of the Constitution and interpreting them to have similar meanings—illuminates the 
meaning of “speech” under the Free Speech Clause. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 747 (1999). In particular, he contends that the term “speech” in the Speech or Debate 
Clause, which provides that Senators and Representatives “shall not be questioned in any other 
Place” for “any Speech or Debate in either House,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, applies only to 
political speech, and therefore that we should interpret the Free Speech Clause to cover only, or at 
least primarily, political speech. Amar, supra, at 815. This line of argumentation has not been met 
with widespread agreement, however, and for purposes of this section I am addressing only broadly 
accepted interpretations. See generally Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Commentary, Hercules, 
Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000) (criticizing Amar’s 
theory of intratextualism). 
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Levy noted more than half a century ago, “The meaning of no other clause 
of the Bill of Rights at the time of its framing and ratification has been [as] 
obscure to us” as that of the Free Speech Clause.27 Many commentators rely 
on underlying theories of the First Amendment—visions about what the 
freedom of speech really means, usually grounded in conceptions of the 
First Amendment’s purpose. The main conceptions that have been offered 
over the years are the marketplace of ideas and the search for truth, self-
government, democratic deliberation, personal autonomy, individual self-
expression, and the government-checking function.28 For better or worse, 
 
27 LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: 
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 4 (1960) [hereinafter LEVY, LEGACY]; see also Stanley C. Brubaker, 
Original Intent and Freedom of Speech and Press (“The debates in Congress concerning the speech and 
press clauses shed scant light on the question of meaning. . . . Nor do we find enlightening comments 
in the state legislatures that considered the amendments or the local newspapers or pamphlets of the 
time.”), in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 82, 85 
(Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991). 
That said, Framing-era materials suggest that the Framing generation held a narrower conception 
of the freedom of speech than do modern courts, and many in the Framing generation adhered to 
Blackstone’s position that the freedom of speech was best understood as a freedom from prior 
restraints. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 
46 (1963) (“Jefferson . . . never protested against the substantive law of seditious libel . . . . He 
accepted without question the dominant view of his generation that government could be 
criminally assaulted merely by the expression of critical opinions that allegedly tended to subvert 
it by lowering it in the public’s esteem.”); LEVY, LEGACY, supra, at xxi (“The evidence drawn 
particularly from the period 1776 to 1791 indicates that the generation that framed . . . the First 
Amendment was hardly as libertarian as we have traditionally assumed.”); Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971) (“In colonial times 
and during and after the Revolution [early political leaders] displayed a determination to punish 
speech thought dangerous to government, much of it expression that we would think harmless and 
well within the bounds of legitimate discourse.”); G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 
57 S.C. L. REV. 1, 60 (2005) (“Since the First Amendment only applied against Congress, this 
approach assumed that the federal government could punish seditious, libelous, blasphemous, 
obscene, or indecent speech with impunity so long as it did not censor the speech in advance.”); 
see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151 (“The liberty of the press is indeed 
essential to the nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon 
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.”). 
28 On the marketplace of ideas, see infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. On the search 
for truth, see generally William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment 
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995). On self-government and democratic deliberation, see generally 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); 
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 119-
78 (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1995); and 
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191. On autonomy, see generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY 
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-224 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994); and Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 
(1979). On the checking function, see generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First 
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521. On self-expression, see generally MARTIN H. 
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no underlying conception of the First Amendment has been widely accepted 
as explaining or driving First Amendment doctrine and thus none can fairly 
be described as a broadly accepted source or form of reasoning.29 
The best-known conception, and that most commonly invoked by the 
Supreme Court, is the marketplace of ideas.30 For instance, the Supreme 
 
REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984); and David A.J. Richards, Free 
Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). 
29 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT at vii (1966) (“Despite the mounting number of decisions and an even greater 
volume of comment, no really adequate or comprehensive theory of the First Amendment has 
been enunciated, much less agreed upon.”); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (2d 
ed. 2003) (“For a while there was a trend toward single-value theories of First Amendment law, in 
which a scholar would posit a single underlying constitutional value and then attempt to deduce all 
First Amendment doctrine from that value. Such efforts, whatever their merits, never seemed to 
persuade many other scholars and were almost entirely ignored by the courts.”); Robert Post, 
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2372 
(2000) (noting that the Supreme Court has not consistently followed any one theory of the First 
Amendment). The absence of a consensus in support of a particular theory of the First Amend-
ment is not surprising: each possible conception of the First Amendment can be subjected to 
legitimate criticism, and reaching agreement at that level of specificity is difficult for any group, 
Justices or otherwise. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is thus one of the 
many areas characterized by incompletely theorized agreements. Cass Sunstein characterizes this 
phenomenon as follows:  
Many judges are minimalists; they want to say and do no more than necessary to re-
solve cases. . . . [Minimalists] attempt to reach incompletely theorized agreements, in 
which the most fundamental questions are left undecided. They prefer outcomes and 
opinions that can attract support from people with a wide range of theoretical posi-
tions, or with uncertainty about which theoretical positions are best. In these ways, 
minimalist judges avoid the largest questions about the meaning of the free speech 
guarantee, or the extent of the Constitution’s protection of “liberty,” or the precise 
scope of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.  
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 48 (footnote omitted). 
30 Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), contains the first, 
and probably the most famous, articulation of the marketplace metaphor, one that “revolutionized 
not just First Amendment doctrine, but popular and academic understandings of free speech.” 
Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 823-24 (2008). Holmes 
wrote, 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come 
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct 
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be 
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Blocher, supra, at 824-25 (“Never before 
or since has a Justice conceived a metaphor that has done so much to change the way that courts, 
lawyers, and the public understand an entire area of constitutional law. Its influence has been both 
descriptive and normative, dominating the explanation of and the justification for free speech in 
the United States.”). 
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Court stated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (in language quoted many 
times since) that “[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”31 
But the marketplace-of-ideas conception has many detractors, and the 
Supreme Court has emphasized different conceptions in some cases and in 
still other cases refrained from choosing any particular theory.32 
Some theorists would argue (in mild rebuke to the Supreme Court) that 
one cannot usefully interpret the bare words of the Free Speech Clause 
without an underlying theory, and the Supreme Court (in mild rebuke to 
those theorists) interprets the Free Speech Clause without an agreed-upon 
theory.33 One way of understanding the first part of this Article is that it 
considers how far broadly accepted forms and sources of reasoning can take 
us without relying on a theory of the Free Speech Clause. 
The central broadly accepted form of legal authority with respect to the 
Free Speech Clause is Supreme Court jurisprudence. Free Speech Clause 
cases have been a significant part of the Supreme Court’s docket for almost 
a century. The number of cases, combined with the broadly accepted 
common law approach to interpreting the Court’s cases, makes for a fairly 
rich jurisprudence. Indeed, what is striking for my purposes is how broadly 
the Court has interpreted the scope of the Free Speech Clause, particularly 
in recent years, with the result that one can fairly answer most of the 
questions about algorithms without relying on any particular theories of the 
First Amendment. The ordinary lawyerly tools of case interpretation take 
us a fair distance. 
 
31 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
32 See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573-75 (1995) (emphasizing the centrality of autonomy to 
the First Amendment); Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart of the First Amendment 
lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs 
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 777 n.11 (1978) (“Freedom of expression has particular significance with respect to 
government because ‘[i]t is here that the state has a special incentive to repress opposition and often 
wields a more effective power of suppression.’” (quoting EMERSON, supra note 29, at 9)); Mills v. 
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[A] major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect 
the free discussion of governmental affairs.”).  
33 See, e.g., Post, supra note 10, at 716 (“Lee Tien is fundamentally misguided to believe that 
he can explain First Amendment coverage ‘without appealing to a grand theoretical framework of 
First Amendment values.’ If First Amendment coverage does not extend to all speech acts, then 
such a framework is at a minimum necessary in order to provide the criteria by which to select the 
subset of speech acts that merit constitutional attention.” (quoting Lee Tien, Publishing Software as 
a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629, 636 (2000))). 
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B.  Expansion and Exceptions 
The history of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has 
been one of expansion. Libel and defamation were thought to be outside of 
the First Amendment’s coverage until New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.34 
Commercial advertising was considered to be beyond the scope of the First 
Amendment until Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc.35 And that expansion of the scope of the Free Speech 
Clause has continued. In the IMS Health litigation, many (including the 
government and the First Circuit) contended that data miners’ sale, transfer, 
and use of prescriber-identifying information was conduct, not speech.36 
But the Supreme Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that “the 
creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of 
the First Amendment.”37 
 
34 See 376 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1964) (stating that although “[r]espondent relies heavily . . . on 
statements of this Court to the effect that the Constitution does not protect libelous publica-
tions . . . libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be 
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment”). 
35 See 425 U.S. 748, 758, 770 (1976) (acknowledging that “in past decisions the Court has given 
some indication that commercial speech is unprotected,” but holding that “commercial speech, like 
other varieties, is protected”).  
36 The First Circuit, for example, stated:  
We say that the challenged elements of the Prescription Information Law principally 
regulate conduct because those provisions serve only to restrict the ability of data 
miners to aggregate, compile, and transfer information destined for narrowly defined 
commercial ends. In our view, this is a restriction on the conduct, not the speech, of 
the data miners. In other words, this is a situation in which information itself has 
become a commodity. The plaintiffs, who are in the business of harvesting, refining, 
and selling this commodity, ask us in essence to rule that because their product is 
information instead of, say, beef jerky, any regulation constitutes a restriction of 
speech. We think that such an interpretation stretches the fabric of the First 
Amendment beyond any rational measure. 
IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc. 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011). 
37 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667. The Court’s discussion in Sorrell is illuminating: 
[T]he United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has characterized pre-
scriber-identifying information as a mere “commodity” with no greater entitlement to 
First Amendment protection than “beef jerky.” In contrast the courts below concluded 
that a prohibition on the sale of prescriber-identifying information is a content-based 
rule akin to a ban on the sale of cookbooks, laboratory results, or train schedules.  
This Court has held that the creation and dissemination of information are speech 
within the meaning of the First Amendment.  Facts, after all, are the beginning point 
for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to 
conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong argument that prescriber-identifying infor-
mation is speech for First Amendment purposes.  
Id. at 2666-67 (internal citations omitted).  
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Not only has the Court expansively construed the coverage of the First 
Amendment (or, if you prefer, narrowed and eliminated assumed exceptions 
to First Amendment coverage), but it has also revealed an unwillingness to 
create new exceptions or construe existing categories of exceptions at a 
broader level of generality. This has been particularly clear in recent years. 
In United States v. Stevens,38 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,39 
and United States v. Alvarez,40 the Supreme Court emphatically rejected 
arguments in favor of broadening the categories that are outside First 
Amendment coverage. Indeed, the Alvarez plurality rejected understanding 
existing exceptions that focus on falsity (like fraud and defamation) as part 
of a more general exclusion of false statements of fact from First Amend-
ment coverage. The flavor of the Court’s approach toward exceptions is 
encapsulated in the following paragraph from Alvarez, quoting Stevens in 
the first two quotations and Brown in the last: 
Although the First Amendment stands against any “freewheeling au-
thority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
Amendment,” the Court has acknowledged that perhaps there exist “some 
categories of speech that have been historically unprotected . . . but have 
not yet been specifically identified or discussed . . . in our case law.” Before 
exempting a category of speech from the normal prohibition on content-
based restrictions, however, the Court must be presented with “persuasive 
evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore 
unrecognized) tradition of proscription.” The Government has not demon-
strated that false statements generally should constitute a new category of 
unprotected speech on this basis.41 
 
38 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
39 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
40 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
41 Id. at 2547 (citations omitted) (quoting, respectively, Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586, and 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734). The Alvarez plurality had earlier noted:  
[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only 
when confined to the few historic and traditional categories [of expression] long 
familiar to the bar . . . . Among these categories are advocacy intended, and likely, to 
incite imminent lawless action; obscenity; defamation; speech integral to criminal 
conduct; so-called “fighting words”; child pornography; fraud; true threats; and 
speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to 
prevent, although a restriction under the last category is most difficult to sustain. 
These categories have a historical foundation in the Court’s free speech tradition. 
The vast realm of free speech and thought always protected in our tradition can still 
thrive, and even be furthered, by adherence to those categories and rules. 
Id. at 2544 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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I emphasize this backdrop because it highlights the Justices’ apparent 
belief that their jurisprudence has laid out the relevant benchmarks for First 
Amendment coverage, subject only to “persuasive evidence that a novel 
restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition 
of proscription.”42 
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND 
ALGORITHM-BASED DECISIONS 
I turn now to the Supreme Court cases most directly relevant to the 
coverage of algorithm-based outputs. That jurisprudence provides meaningful 
guidance. Brown is a good starting point. The Brown Court began its 
analysis of the legal issues in the case by stating flatly, “California correctly 
acknowledges that video games qualify for First Amendment protection.”43 
After noting that “it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, 
and dangerous to try” and quoting from Winters v. New York,44 the Court 
concluded its discussion by stating categorically that “[v]ideo games com-
municate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary 
devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features 
distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual 
world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.”45 In one short 
paragraph the Court concluded that video games are speech, period.  
And there is a significant dog that didn’t bark: the Court stated broadly 
that “video games” are covered by the First Amendment—not particular 
types of video games that entail certain kinds of interactions, but all video 
games.46 The only possible limit implied by the Court’s reasoning is that 
video games communicate ideas, but the Court’s discussion makes it clear that 
 
42 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.  
43 Id. at 2733. 
44 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). 
45 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733. The entirety of the Court’s discussion is as follows: 
California correctly acknowledges that video games qualify for First Amendment 
protection. The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public 
matters, but we have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from 
entertainment, and dangerous to try. “Everyone is familiar with instances of propa-
ganda through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.” 
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Like the protected books, plays, and 
movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social mes-
sages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and 
music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interac-
tion with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.  
Id. 
46 Id.  
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it has a very low threshold for what constitutes such communication. Indeed, 
Justice Alito’s concurrence argued at some length that video games were 
quite different from recognized forms of speech like books,47 prompting the 
majority to respond that “[e]ven if we can see in them ‘nothing of any 
possible value to society . . . , they are as much entitled to the protection of 
free speech as the best of literature.’”48 It is certainly possible that a future 
Supreme Court could draw distinctions among video games, but nothing in 
Brown provides any support for such distinctions. 
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I),49 confronting a 
First Amendment challenge to a statute that required cable operators to air 
local broadcast television stations,50 the Court flatly rejected the suggestion 
that this was ordinary economic regulation, and more specifically that cable 
operators were not engaged in speech for First Amendment purposes: 
There can be no disagreement on an initial premise: Cable programmers 
and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to 
the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment. 
Through “original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over 
which stations or programs to include in its repertoire,” cable programmers 
and operators “see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics 
and in a wide variety of formats.”51  
This language suggests two—and only two—elements for First Amendment 
coverage: first, that cable programmers and operators either create pro-
gramming or choose what to air; and, second, that in doing so they seek to 
communicate messages on a variety of topics. 
Turner I’s focus on seeking to communicate messages is consistent with 
Supreme Court jurisprudence that has always treated substantive communi-
cation or self-expression as a necessary condition for the application of the 
First Amendment.52 In every case in which the Court has applied the First 
 
47 See id. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“There are reasons to suspect that 
the experience of playing violent video games just might be very different from reading a book, 
listening to the radio, or watching a movie or a television show.”). 
48 Id. at 2737 n.4 (quoting Winters, 333 U.S. at 510). 
49 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
50 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385, 106 
Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
51 512 U.S. at 636 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. 
Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)). As the internal quotation indicates, the Court 
put forward the same test in Preferred Communications.  
52 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (stating that the First Amendment 
“was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people”); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ENQUIRY 94 (1982) (“Communication dominates all the arguments that would with any plausibil-
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Amendment, abridgement of substantive communication has been the 
issue.53 Some of those abridgements are content-neutral, but the key is that 
they interfere with a person’s or entity’s ability to communicate content. 
The touchstone of the Court’s First Amendment cases has always been that 
the underlying activity entails an expression of ideas, even if it is not “a 
narrow, succinctly articulable message.”54 Communication thus seems to 
require, at a minimum, a speaker who seeks to transmit some substantive 
message or messages55 to a listener who can recognize that message.56 Thus, 
 
ity generate a Free Speech Principle.”); Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect 
Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1274 (2010) 
(“The Supreme Court has been very clear about the First Amendment requirement that speakers 
must engage in definitive communication before receiving constitutional protection for speech.”); 
Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the Interpretation of 
Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 920-21 (1979) (“The Court is saying that the communi-
cation of ideas is at once the essential first amendment purpose and the essential first amendment 
property. Without this purpose or property, activity is not protected by the first amendment.”). 
One might reasonably ask what work “self-expression” is doing in the formulation in the text, 
on the assumption that self-expression is a substantive communication. Adding “self-expression” 
clarifies the inclusion of forms of expression that have been recognized as implicating the freedom 
of speech even though they arguably do not entail a clear substantive communication—in 
particular, recognized forms of art and symbolism. As the Supreme Court stated in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.: 
The protected expression that inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners and 
songs . . . for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as medi-
ums of expression. Noting that “[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of 
communicating ideas,” our cases have recognized that the First Amendment shields 
such acts as saluting a flag (and refusing to do so), wearing an armband to protest a 
war, displaying a red flag, and even “[m]arching, walking or parading” in uni-
forms displaying the swastika. As some of these examples show, a narrow, succinctly 
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined 
to expressions conveying a “particularized message,” would never reach the unques-
tionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or 
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.  
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citations omitted) (quoting, respectively, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 
43 (1977) (per curiam); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam).  
53 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 
(2006) (noting that the Supreme Court has “extended First Amendment protection only to 
conduct that is inherently expressive”); Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10 (finding that the display of an 
American flag with peace symbols was an activity “sufficiently imbued with elements of communi-
cation to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments”). 
54 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 
55 In the remainder of this Article, I will use the term “message” to refer to one or more 
messages for the sake of convenience and brevity. 
56 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 54 (1989) 
(“When the message is an aspect of what the actor is trying to do and is understood by the 
audience as such, we can say comfortably that the act communicates the message and that the free 
speech principle is relevant.”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First 
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 36 (1973) (“Whatever else may or may not be true of speech, as 
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in order to communicate, one must have a message that is sendable and 
receivable and that one actually chooses to send.57 
Choosing to send a sendable and receivable substantive message may be 
necessary for First Amendment coverage, but that does not mean they are 
sufficient for such coverage. Aren’t those criteria incomplete? 
The answer may well be yes if we are considering the best definition of 
“speech” as a matter of first principles, but that is not my goal here. Such a 
foundational inquiry has felled many trees and is beyond the scope (and 
word limit) of this Article. 
Instead, in keeping with my focus on Supreme Court jurisprudence as 
the source of widely accepted guideposts, I will ask two questions that focus 
on possible incompleteness through the lens of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence: First, is relying solely on the minima identified above 
(choosing to send a sendable and receivable message) and the exceptions the 
Court has articulated inconsistent with the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence? Second, can we adopt one of the competing theories of the 
First Amendment in a way that keeps algorithm-based decisions out of First 
Amendment coverage but isn’t significantly inconsistent with the Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence? I will address the second question in the 
next Part, but let me consider the first question here. 
In posing this question, I am not asking whether the criteria I identify 
are complete for purposes of explicating the Supreme Court’s approach to 
First Amendment coverage. They are not. The Court has articulated 
exceptions and qualifications applicable to, for example, expressive conduct,58 
specific kinds of communications (such as speech integral to criminal 
 
an irreducible minimum it must constitute a communication. That, in turn, implies both a 
communicator and a communicatee—a speaker and an audience.”); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 206 (1972) (“[By] ‘acts of expression’ . . . I mean 
to include any act that is intended by its agent to communicate to one or more persons some 
proposition or attitude.”). 
57 Tim Wu says that while this standard “accurately describes what the Court says, it doesn’t 
come close to describing what courts do.” Wu, supra note 6, at 1529. Some lower courts have issued 
opinions that may be in tension with this standard, but the Supreme Court has not done so, and 
my focus is on the Court’s jurisprudence. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. Wu’s 
alternative formulation, by contrast, is not consistent with the prevailing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. See infra note 84. 
This should not obscure one of the important points on which Wu and I agree: the First 
Amendment standard I glean from the Court’s jurisprudence includes a great deal within its 
purview. Indeed, this Article underscores that breadth, which raises the question whether the 
Court has gone too far. That question will become more salient insofar as algorithms increase the 
number of activities encompassed by the First Amendment standard. In this Article I argue that 
there is no nonarbitrary way to excise algorithm-based outputs from First Amendment coverage 
without significantly altering First Amendment jurisprudence more generally. 
58 See, e.g., Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65-66 (discussing what sorts of conduct are expressive and 
covered by the First Amendment). 
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conduct),59 and specific contexts (such as public fora).60 Rather, I am asking 
whether applying the criteria identified above plus the exceptions the Court 
has articulated would be inconsistent with some elements of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Are the criteria plus exceptions so incomplete that they do not 
adhere to some of the Court’s rulings? This question may seem nonsensical 
insofar as it can be boiled down to “Is the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
inconsistent with itself?” But the question makes sense in the context of a 
multimember Court often reaching incompletely theorized agreements 
resolving specific disputes arising out of others’ actions.61 
The narrow answer is that the criteria and existing exceptions would not 
upend any existing Supreme Court jurisprudence. No Supreme Court 
holdings would be disturbed, no Supreme Court doctrines would have to be 
recast.62 The Court has never found a substantive communication that was 
sendable, receivable, and actually sent to be outside First Amendment 
coverage unless it fell into one of the Court’s articulated exceptions. The 
broader answer is that the breadth of First Amendment coverage suggested 
by these criteria might motivate us to find ways to narrow the application of 
First Amendment scrutiny, a topic I discuss later in this Article. 
To return to the criteria identified above: The Court’s reasoning indicates 
that the First Amendment encompasses many algorithm-based manipula-
tions. Consider a person who creates a billboard or webpage entitled “Our 
National Debt” that presents a running (and thus increasing) tally of the 
U.S. national debt.63 The central feature of this billboard or webpage is 
 
59 See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). For a recent list 
of First Amendment exceptions, see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. C.t. 2537, 2544 (2012) 
(including speech integral to criminal conduct, obscenity, and incitement, to name a few) 
(plurality opinion). 
60 See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-85 (1992) 
(discussing the public forum doctrine). 
61 See Sunstein, supra note 29, at 48 (identifying incompletely theorized agreements as those 
“in which the most fundamental questions are left undecided”). 
62 The same may not be true with respect to lower courts’ jurisprudence. Most notably, 
lower courts have found that encyclopedias, how-to books, etc. are covered by the First Amend-
ment, but have upheld liability for defective aeronautical charts without suggesting that such 
liability raised any First Amendment issues. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 
642 F.2d 339, 341-44 (9th Cir. 1981) (addressing liability for a defective aeronoautical chart 
without discussing the First Amendment); cf. Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 n.9 
(9th Cir. 1985) (not reaching the First Amendment issue in a case involving an aeronautical chart 
because it was raised for the first time on appeal). It may be that aeronautical charts are best 
understood as falling into an exception that the Supreme Court has articulated. But it may well be 
that the Court’s jurisprudence would treat these charts as speech for First Amendment purposes. 
63 This is not a product of my imagination, of course. There is a well-known, billboard-sized 
“National Debt Clock” in Manhattan. Its central features are tallies of the national debt and the 
debt per American family. (The only text reads “Our National Debt,” “Your Family Share,” and 
“The National Debt Clock.”) The clock simply follows an algorithm to calculate the national debt 
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simply a dollar figure generated by a computer running a program designed 
to measure the national debt. There need be no human involvement beyond 
creating the billboard or webpage and the program measuring the debt. Yet 
I don’t think there is any real doubt that such a billboard or webpage would 
constitute speech in light of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. It conveys 
a substantive message. Its running total of the national debt reflects a focus 
on and interest in the size of the national debt. It may not be clear to 
viewers exactly what the creator is trying to say about the national debt, but 
if nothing else the billboard or webpage communicates that the national 
debt is sufficiently important to merit this focus.64 
Significantly, many communications that the Supreme Court treats as 
speech do not express a clear viewpoint, from a banner stating “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS”65 to almost every form of art. Given the ambiguities 
inherent in almost every piece of art, the Supreme Court’s application of 
First Amendment protections to art precludes a requirement of a clear 
viewpoint or message. As the Court stated in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., “a narrow, succinctly articulable 
message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to 
expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the 
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold 
Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”66 In Hurley the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Boston St. Patrick’s 
Day parade was not speech for First Amendment purposes because “it is 
impossible to discern any specific expressive purpose entitling the Parade to 
 
and then displays the result. There are also websites that perform similar functions. See, e.g., US 
DEBT CLOCK, http://www.usdebtclock.org (providing continuously updated information on the 
national debt and related numbers—gross domestic product, credit card debt, etc.).  
64 Note that the fact that the person or entity claiming to be engaged in speech does not 
create the underlying content is irrelevant for purposes of First Amendment coverage. See Hurley 
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995) (“First 
Amendment protection [does not] require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item 
featured in the communication. . . . [T]he presentation of an edited compilation of speech 
generated by other persons is a staple of most newspapers’ opinion pages, which, of course, fall 
squarely within the core of First Amendment security, as does even the simple selection of a paid 
noncommercial advertisement for inclusion in a daily paper.” (citations omitted)); Turner I, 512 
U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (finding that cable operators “engage in and transmit speech” by choosing 
channels to air); see also Danny Sullivan, The New York Times Algorithm & Why It Needs Government 
Regulation, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (July 15, 2010) http://searchengineland.com/regulating-the-
new-york-times-46521 (analogizing Google to a newspaper). 
65 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). The Court treated the banner as speech 
under the First Amendment even though “the message on Frederick’s banner is cryptic. It is no 
doubt offensive to some, perhaps amusing to others. To still others, it probably means nothing at 
all.” Id. at 401. 
66 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (citations omitted). 
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protection under the First Amendment.”67 But the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
reversing, unanimously rejected that argument, stating that “the parade 
does not consist of individual, unrelated segments that happen to be 
transmitted together for individual selection by members of the audience. 
Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, each is understood to 
contribute something to a common theme.”68 The Court explained that, 
“[r]ather like a composer, the Council [running the parade] selects the 
expressive units of the parade from potential participants, and though the 
score may not produce a particularized message, each contingent’s expression 
in the Council’s eyes comports with what merits celebration on that day.”69 
Imagine that a person sets up a bulletin board (an old-fashioned, physical 
bulletin board) on which she posts every article she finds that uses some 
specific words (say, “God is dead”70). She is not creating the articles; she is 
merely collecting articles written by others. And she is not editing beyond 
looking for the words; she is indiscriminately amassing all articles that use 
these words. But I think we would regard the bulletin board as speech for 
First Amendment purposes. The bulletin board would be communicating a 
substantive message to those who viewed it. Her viewpoint might not be 
clear (does she agree or disagree that God is dead?) but, if nothing else, the 
bulletin board tells her viewers that she thinks this topic is important 
enough to merit special attention, in the form of her bulletin board. 
Presenting all articles containing the words “God is dead” (or “Boston St. 
Patrick’s Day Parade,” for that matter) would not present a single clear 
message; rather, as in Turner I, it would constitute an exercise of editorial 
discretion through which the bulletin board editor sought to communicate a 
message about the importance of articles containing the words “God is dead.”  
Now imagine that the bulletin board editor discovers the Internet, and 
she transmogrifies her physical bulletin board into a virtual one. She 
performs computer searches for “God is dead” and posts links to all the 
articles that incorporate this phrase. Then she realizes that she can largely 
automate this process, so she creates a macro that lets her hit a single key to 
search the Web for the words “God is dead,” and another macro that lets 
her hit a second key to upload onto her bulletin board any link that is not 
already posted. She begins to tire of performing these searches and realizes 
that a trained monkey could perform this task. Fortunately for her, she has 
a trained monkey, so she decides to let the monkey hit the two keys. The 
 
67 Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. v. City of Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1299 
(Mass. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d sub. nom Hurley, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
68 515 U.S. at 576. 
69 Id. at 574. 
70 This example is not of my own making; I adapted it from elsewhere.  
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bulletin board editor then combines the operation into a single key for the 
monkey. Finally, after the monkey tires of all this typing, the bulletin board 
editor realizes that she can create a program that will automatically perform 
the search and post the relevant links without needing the monkey. Once 
the program starts, it continually searches the Web. In these steps from a 
physical bulletin board to an automated process, nothing relevant to free 
speech coverage under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has changed. 
When it was physical, the editor’s bulletin board communicated the 
importance to her of articles containing the words “God is dead.” The same 
thing is communicated when the process is automated. 
Similarly, consider the following progression: a time-pressed reporter 
realizes that she can write more articles if she uses some standard boilerplate 
to communicate information that arises repeatedly. She starts with cutting 
and pasting but finds that too laborious. So she creates macros for standard 
descriptions (e.g., “Team A scored seven runs in the third inning, and team 
B then scored nine runs in the third inning”). The macros become more 
complex, and utilize fancier language (e.g., “in one inning the visitors 
notched an impressive 7 runs in the top half of the third inning, but the 
home team responded with a whopping nine runs in the bottom of the 
third”). The macros become so sophisticated that the reporter can create a 
template for virtually every outcome, and by adding some facts can stitch 
together blocks of text that produce a coherent article. Eventually, the 
reporter’s computer skills become so advanced that she can input some basic 
data from a spreadsheet (e.g., the box score from a baseball game) and run a 
macro that creates an entire article based on those facts. Finally she creates 
a macro that gathers those facts and writes the article, leaving her creative 
input entirely in the creation of the programs. 
This is not a fanciful example. A company called Narrative Science 
“produce[s] content by way of algorithm, no human reporting necessary,” 
for publications such as Forbes.71 Narrative Science employs “meta-writers” 
 
71 See The State of the News Media 2013: Annual Report on American Journalism, PEW RES. 
CTR.’S PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE JOURNALISM, available at http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/ 
overview-5 (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); see also NARRATIVE SCIENCE, http://narrativescience.com 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (“Using complex Artificial Intelligence algorithms, [our program] extracts 
and organizes key facts and insights and transforms them into stories, at scale.”). 
In fact, the baseball example comes from an article quoting the following from a Narrative 
Science article: 
Friona fell 10-8 to Boys Ranch in five innings on Monday at Friona despite racking 
up seven hits and eight runs. Friona was led by a flawless day at the dish by Hunter 
Sundre, who went 2-2 against Boys Ranch pitching. Sundre singled in the third in-
ning and tripled in the fourth inning . . . Friona piled up the steals, swiping eight 
bags in all. 
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and engineers who work with its clients to determine what facts and angles 
are of interest to them, compile a relevant vocabulary, and create algorithms 
to construct the articles.72 As with the example of the “God is dead” bulletin 
board, it is hard to see how any step in this progression crosses a line 
between speech and nonspeech that arises from the Court’s jurisprudence. 
The reporter/programmer is producing a substantive communication via 
editorial decisions. She designs the boilerplate and the mechanisms to put it 
together, and she does so in order to convey substantive information. Note 
that in all the steps of the progression, the reporter/programmer is relying 
to some degree on boilerplate that she did not create specially for the 
occasion. With each step she pushes more of her input to the front end (the 
creation of the boilerplate and the macros to input them), and leaves more 
implementation for the programs she has created.73 
Most of the examples above involve webpages that focus on one particular 
area of interest. Does the analysis change without that focus? No. Suppose 
someone decides to create a website with the most important news of the 
moment, and the creator’s substantive judgment is that importance is a 
function of popularity: the more popular an item is, the more important it 
is. So she creates an algorithm to identify news-oriented websites and to 
measure the popularity of items appearing on those websites, and the 
product of those algorithms yields an ever-changing set of links (in order of 
popularity) on her webpage. Above the links, her webpage says, “Here is 
the most important news, and by ‘most important’ I mean most popular.” 
Her page would just be an automated collection of links, but under Turner I 
it would be speech. Similarly, a search engine that tells users “We prioritize 
 
Steven Levy, Can an Algorithm Write a Better News Story than a Human Reporter?, WIRED (April 24, 
2012), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/04/can-an-algorithm-write-a-better-news-story-than-a-
human-reporter/all (quoting a Narrative Science article). Not bad for a computer, eh? 
72 See Amy Hadfield, Narrative Science, Newsblaster Show that Algorithm-Writing Articles Have 
a Key Role to Play in Journalism’s Future, EDITORS WEBLOG (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www. 
editorsweblog.org/2012/08/22/narrative-science-newsblaster-show-that-algorithm-writing-articles-
have-a-key-role-to-pla (noting that Narrative Science “employs a team of ‘meta-writers’—
journalists who work alongside the company’s engineers to produce a set of templates that give the 
story its ‘angle,’ the most interesting element of the event it is writing up. To construct sentences, 
the algorithms draw on topic-specific lists of vocabulary provided by the meta-writers, and then 
place these sentences within pre-set article frameworks”). 
This is not unique to articles, nor is it that new. In 2008 a Russian publishing company pro-
grammed software to create a novel that was a variation on Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina written 
in the style of Haruki Murakami (whose books were uploaded into the program). See Irina Titova, 
Book Written by Computer Hits Shelves, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Russ.) (Jan. 22, 2008), available 
at http://www.sptimes.ru/story/24786. The publisher’s chief editor explained, “Today publishing 
houses use different methods of the fastest possible book creation in this or that style meant for 
this or that readers’ audience. Our program can help with that work.” Id. He added, “However, 
the program can never become an author, like PhotoShop can never be Raphael.” Id. 
73 We have not yet, to my knowledge, reached that point with law review articles. Beep. 
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websites that are family friendly” is communicating a substantive message in 
its deletion of adult-oriented links. Or, in a different vein, an aggregator or 
search engine that promises “We prioritize links that have the most outra-
geous porn on the Web” is sending a substantive message that its users will 
receive, and that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence would treat as speech. 
That brings me to a search engine called blekko.74 It presents itself on its 
main page as “the spam-free search engine,”75 and beyond that states flatly: 
“blekko biases towards quality sites. We do not attempt to gather all of the 
world’s information. We purposefully bias our index away from sites with 
low quality content.”76 Not much translation is needed here: blekko is 
making editorial decisions based on quality. Blekko is not generating the 
linked-to content on its own, but the same is true of most of the examples 
above (and of the Drudge Report and other link aggregators).77 
That said, there are two distinctions between blekko and most of the 
examples above that might seem relevant for First Amendment purposes. 
First, whereas one might surmise that the creators of the National Debt 
webpage and the “God is dead” link page are motivated by a particular 
viewpoint (even if one might guess incorrectly what that viewpoint was), 
one cannot plausibly ascribe any viewpoint to blekko, as it is a general 
interest tool. Second, rather than collect items of interest in advance, it 
searches for them based on the user’s preferences. These two points are 
closely related. Search engines respond to users’ queries and present 
information in light of those queries, and they do not screen for or focus on 
particular viewpoints. 
As to the first point, under the prevailing jurisprudence, First Amend-
ment coverage is not limited to speakers with a specific viewpoint, or even 
 
74 See BLEKKO, http://blekko.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
75 Id.  
76 About, BLEKKO, http://blekko.com/about (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).  
77 A search engine called DuckDuckGo adopts a strategy that is in some ways between blekko 
and Google, in that it focuses on blocking spam as a proxy for relevance. See DUCKDUCKGO, 
https://duckduckgo.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). DuckDuckGo’s founder Gabriel Weinberg 
explained in an interview that “[t]he main benefit you see right away is we try to get way better 
instant answers. . . . We’re also way more aggressive with spam.” Jose Vilches, Interview with 
DuckDuckGo Founder Gabriel Weinberg, TECHSPOT (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.techspot.com/ 
article/559-gabriel-weinberg-interview/page2.html. Weinberg added,  
There’s been a lot of the data that shows that initially when people click on content 
farm results, they actually like them because they often match their query exactly. 
But we believe that in the long run you won’t like them, because they’re often low 
quality content. So, that’s a hard problem for search engines because a lot of the 
metrics they use for relevance show those results are very relevant, even though I 
think that they’re not.  
Id.  
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to speech of particular value.78 Magazines that publish articles on politics 
from every political perspective engage in what everyone would agree is 
speech, even if the editors themselves have no identifiable political views of 
their own. Regarding the second point, this seems to be a distinction 
without a difference for First Amendment purposes. Consider two plat-
forms. The first compiles in advance a list of all the information sources 
that it judges to be of high quality, and it lets users search among and select 
those sources in a variety of ways. The second platform does not compile 
anything in advance, but instead selects the information sources it judges to 
be of high quality in response to users’ queries. We can call the first platform 
“digital cable television that emphasizes quality” and the second platform 
“blekko.” They are making the same judgments (well, assuming a digital 
cable television operator that in fact emphasizes quality). The only difference 
is the users’ browsing experience, for users who choose to browse rather 
than simply search. It is difficult to see how anything of constitutional 
significance could turn on this distinction. Even if it did, it is not clear 
which way the distinction would cut. Having an installed library of choices 
allows users to passively graze (or channel surf, in the digital cable context), 
whereas giving only the choice of search requires more active participation 
on the part of the user. The result is that the product of that search may be 
less reflective of the decisions of the platform and more reflective of the 
decisions of the user, but it is not clear whether that makes this product 
more or less clearly “speech.” In any event, nothing seems to turn on the 
level of user participation, because both platforms are best understood as 
engaging in speech under the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Is Google different from blekko under the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence? I think not. Google often articulates its goals in terms of quality. For 
instance, it presented its 2011 changes to its algorithms (known as Panda) as 
 
78 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (“Most of what we say to one 
another lacks ‘religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value’ 
(let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from government regulation. Even ‘[w]holly 
neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or 
Donne’s sermons.’” (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971))). 
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a means of returning more high-quality websites.79 Google also articulates 
its goals in terms of relevance and usefulness for its users.80 
 
79 See Matt Cutts, Another Step to Reward High-Quality Sites, GOOGLE WEBMASTER CENTRAL 
BLOG (Apr. 24, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2012/04/another-
step-to-reward-high-quality.html (“The goal of many of our ranking changes is to help searchers 
find sites that provide a great user experience and fulfill their information needs. We also want the 
‘good guys’ making great sites for users, not just algorithms, to see their effort rewarded. To that 
end we’ve launched Panda changes that successfully returned higher-quality sites in search 
results.”). 
80 This relates to an interesting and revealing episode involving Google searches. In 2004, 
the top result in Google searches for “jew” was Jew Watch, which markets itself as “An Oasis of 
News for Americans Who Presently Endure the Hateful Censorship of Zionist Occupation” and 
features stridently anti-Jewish content. See JEW WATCH, http://www.jewwatch.com (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2013); see also James Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 939, 
943-45 (2008–2009); Somini Sengupta, Opinion, Free Speech in the Age of YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 2012, at SR 4. This led a Jewish activist to link the word “jew” to a Wikipedia article 
instead of Jew Watch, followed by neo-Nazi efforts to point “jew” back to jewwatch.com. See 
Grimmelmann, supra, at 943. Activists also requested that Google change its search results so that 
they would exclude Jew Watch entirely, or, at a minimum, exclude it from search results for “jew.” 
Id. As Grimelmann has noted, “Google could easily have changed their software so no trace of Jew 
Watch remained in its results pages, no indication that anything other than the usual process of 
looking for relevant results had ever taken place.” Id. Google chose not to demote or remove Jew 
Watch, but it added a link to a Google site as one of the top results for “jew,” with Google’s own 
message. Id. at 943-44. The website, entitled An Explanation of Our Search Results, begins by 
stating, “If you recently used Google to search for the word ‘Jew,’ you may have seen results that 
were very disturbing. We assure you that the views expressed by the sites in your results are not in 
any way endorsed by Google.” An Explanation of Our Search Results, GOOGLE, http://www.google. 
com/explanation.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). The website goes on to explain: 
A site’s ranking in Google’s search results relies heavily on computer algorithms using 
thousands of factors to calculate a page’s relevance to a given query . . . .  
The beliefs and preferences of those who work at Google, as well as the opin-
ions of the general public, do not determine or impact our search results. . . . We 
will, however, remove pages from our results if we believe the page (or its site) vio-
lates our Webmaster Guidelines, if we believe we are required to do so by law, or at 
the request of the webmaster who is responsible for the page. 
Id. Thus Google, in both the content and placement of this webpage, engaged in speech, and a key 
element of that speech was its denial of the relevance of its workers’ beliefs and preferences 
(though it noted the relevance of its guidelines in making its decisions about what to remove). As 
Grimmelmann noted in response: 
Is it really the case that search engine results are purely automated, impersonal 
things that don’t reflect anyone’s opinion at all? In one sense, passing the buck and 
saying “don’t blame us, the computers did it” is an uncomfortable position for any 
computer programmer to take. Who, after all, gave the computer its instructions? 
The programmer did. Everything that Google’s automated ranking system does, it 
does because Google programmers told it to. A computer is just a glorified abacus; it 
does what you tell it to. . . . 
And, of course, the “beliefs and preferences” of Google’s employees and users 
do enter into its search results in another sense. The employees prefer that Google 
return results that the users believe to be useful. They optimize their algorithms all 
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What if we assume that Google (or another algorithm-based provider) 
does not care about “quality,” but instead only about relevance and usefulness 
for the user? Are Google’s algorithm-based outputs based on its understanding 
of relevance and usefulness speech under the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence? Yes. Google disclaims any adoption of the expression in the sites it 
finds,81 but it is making all sorts of judgments in determining what its 
customers want.82 There is a reasonable argument against this conclusion, 
flowing from the position that editing and transmitting information based 
on what users want is not an expression of the speaker’s own desires and thus 
is not real speech. As I discuss in the next Part, however, the Supreme Court 
has not adopted that position and its jurisprudence is not consistent with it. 
Many algorithm-based outputs will not constitute speech under this 
jurisprudence because they are not sending a substantive message. Trans-
mission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (often referred to as 
TCP/IP) route information through the Internet, but its creators are not 
communicating a substantive message in doing so.83 But when people create 
algorithms in order to selectively present information based on its perceived 
importance or value or relevance, Turner I indicates that they are speakers 
for purposes of the First Amendment (or the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence, at any rate). Nothing in the Court’s jurisprudence supports the 
proposition that reliance on algorithms transforms speech into nonspeech. 
The touchstone is sending a substantive message, and such a message can be 
sent with or without relying on algorithms.84 
 
the time to make the results more relevant to their users’ questions. They don’t want 
you to get Jew Watch if you search for “mongolian gerbils.” 
Grimmelmann, supra, at 944. 
81 See An Explanation of Our Search Results, supra note 80 (“We assure you that the views 
expressed by the sites in your results are not in any way endorsed by Google.”). 
82 See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 188, 189, 192 (2006) (titling his first section “Search Engines Make Editorial 
Choices” and stating that “search engines make editorial judgments just like any other media 
company”). For an example of Google debating how to improve searches for its customers, see 
Google, Search Quality Meeting: Spelling for Long Queries (Annotated), YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtRJXnXgE-A (showing Google’s search quality team deliberating 
on algorithmic decisions during a meeting held on December 1, 2011). 
83 For an explanation of the TCP/IP protocols, see Jonathan Strickland, How Does the Internet 
Work?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (May 7, 2010), http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/ 
internet1.htm.  
84 In his contribution to this Symposium, Tim Wu argues that under the prevailing jurispru-
dence, the key inquiry is whether the alleged speaker adopts the information it provides as its 
own. See Wu, supra note 6, 1530 (“Neither the newspaper nor cable operator cases support the idea 
that the First Amendment protects something like an index, as opposed to content adopted or 
selected by the speaker as its own. It is that step—the adoption of information, as a publisher, as 
opposed to merely pointing the user to it—that marks the difference.”). I agree with Wu that the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not support treating an unedited index as speech, but I do 
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One final note: many trees were felled before Brown was decided, as 
courts and commentators debated whether video games constituted speech 
for First Amendment purposes.85 And yet the Court treated this as a 
question with an obvious answer. Indeed, part of what is so striking about 
the opinion is how easy the Court found the answer to be.86 
IV. PRODUCING A DIFFERENT RESULT 
As I noted above, there are a host of competing conceptions of free 
speech, none of which has been widely accepted as explaining or driving 
 
not think the line he articulates arises from, or is consistent with, that jurisprudence. The Court in 
Turner I held that cable operators engage in speech because of their editing, without any sugges-
tion that cable operators do, or need to, adopt as their own the communications of the channels 
they carry. See 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (“Through . . . ‘exercising editorial discretion over which 
stations . . .  to include in its repertoire,’ cable . . . operators ‘see[k] to communicate messages . . . .”); 
see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995) 
(noting that “even the simple selection of a paid noncommercial advertisement for inclusion in a 
daily paper” “fall[s] squarely within the core of First Amendment security”). Under Turner I, 
engaging in substantive editing sends a message and thus triggers application of the First 
Amendment—no adoption or endorsement of the carried programming is needed. To use Wu’s 
example, no one who watches Fox News, MSNBC, or any other cable channel addressing topic X 
says, “Look what my cable operator said about X yesterday,” or, “It was interesting what my cable 
operator had to say about X.” Nonetheless, the First Amendment encompasses the cable operator’s 
selection of channels. See Wu, supra note 6, at 1528 (using the quoted language to illustrate the line 
he sees between speech and nonspeech in the jurisprudence relevant to search engines); see also 
infra note 98 (discussing the implications of Wu’s line). 
85 See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 
1133-34 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (finding that video games are not speech for First Amendment purposes), 
rev’d, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); America’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 
536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); Marc Jonathan Blitz, A First Amendment for Second 
Life: What Virtual Worlds Mean for the Law of Video Games, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779, 785 
(2009) (arguing that even nonnarrative video games and other “communication-free forms of 
electronic imagery” should be “staunchly protected”); Terri R. Day & Ryan C. W. Hall, Déjà Vu: 
From Comic Books to Video Games: Legislative Reliance on “Soft Science” to Protect Against Uncertain 
Societal Harm Linked to Violence v. the First Amendment, 89 OR. L. REV. 415, 450 (2010) (arguing 
that video games are “no less deserving of First Amendment protection than movies, works of art, 
and literature”); Patrick M. Garry, Defining Speech in an Entertainment Age: The Case of First 
Amendment Protection for Video Games, 57 SMU L. REV. 101, 122 (2004) (arguing against full First 
Amendment protection for video games); Paul E. Salamanca, Video Games as a Protected Form of 
Expression, 40 GA. L. REV. 153, 194-205 (2005) (arguing against viewing video games as unprotected 
speech); Kevin W. Saunders, Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video Games: Three Responses to First 
Amendment Concerns, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51, 101-05 (arguing that video games are noncom-
municative and not speech for First Amendment purposes); Anthony Ventry III, Note, Application 
of the First Amendment to Violent and Nonviolent Video Games, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1129, 1131 
(2004) (arguing that “courts should apply a case-by-case approach in determining whether video 
games are constitutionally protected speech instead of deciding conclusively that all video games 
are (or are not) protected speech”). 
86 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text; see also Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (“Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression 
protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”) 
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First Amendment doctrine.87 But let me now ask whether adopting one of 
the competing theories of the First Amendment would produce a different 
result without upending existing case law. More broadly, how easy or hard 
would it be to craft a coherent exception to the prevailing First Amendment 
jurisprudence such that algorithm-based decisions, or search results more 
specifically, would not be encompassed by the First Amendment but most 
of the remaining First Amendment jurisprudence would remain? This is 
different from asking whether, in the first instance, any theory of the First 
Amendment would exclude algorithm-based decisions from coverage. The 
answer to that question is yes. That is, we could rely on a particular concep-
tion of the First Amendment that would radically rethink the Supreme 
Court’s existing approach in ways that would exclude search engine results 
and much else. We could, for example, limit “the freedom of speech” in the 
First Amendment to core political speech, or speech that directly promotes 
a meaningfully constrained notion of democratic deliberation or self-
government, and thereby exclude search engine results, as a category, from 
the ambit of the First Amendment.88 We would also exclude most forms of 
art, however.89 My question in this Part is, without radically changing our 
First Amendment jurisprudence, how easy would it be to exclude algorithm-
based decisions, or search engine results more specifically? 
A.  Relying on Particular Theories of the First Amendment 
The most obvious possibility would be to focus the First Amendment 
analysis on individuals. This could lead to a suggestion that communications 
by corporations do not constitute speech. But newspapers and magazines 
are owned by corporations, and a revamping of the First Amendment to 
exclude those publications as speech would be a radical departure from our 
existing jurisprudence. 
 
87 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
88 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 27, at 20 (“Constitutional protection should be accorded only to 
speech that is explicitly political.”). 
89 We could avoid such a result if we adopted a very broad definition of “core political 
speech,” “democratic deliberation,” or “self-government,” but then we would end up back where 
we started. As Frederick Schauer has noted,  
Theories based on self-government or democratic deliberation have a hard time 
explaining why (except as mistakes, of course) the doctrine now covers pornography, 
commercial advertising, and art, inter alia—none of which has much to do with 
political deliberation or self-governance, except under such an attenuated definition 
of “political” that the justification’s core loses much of its power.  
Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 5, at 1785. 
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One might instead try to exclude from First Amendment coverage 
speech that a corporation makes purely for its own benefit. The problem is 
that it is difficult to come up with any articulation of speech in a corporation’s 
interest that would exclude algorithm-based decisions, or more specifically 
search engine results, without also excluding newspapers and magazines. A 
distinction based on speech that is in a corporation’s interest fails to distin-
guish newspapers and magazines. Same for excluding speech that is aimed 
solely at increasing a corporation’s value. Indeed, for a newspaper or 
magazine owner who is a faithful agent, with shareholders who want the 
highest possible return on their investment, presumably all the owner’s 
actions would be undertaken in order to maximize shareholder value. 
Simply stated, search results are in the search engine’s interests in the same 
way that compelling content is in the interest of any conveyor of content, 
whether newspaper, political website, or porn website.90 
A more conventional line would distinguish commercial speech. A number 
of theorists have argued for the exclusion of commercial speech from First 
Amendment coverage.91 This would be a fairly significant reworking of 
First Amendment jurisprudence.92 Excluding commercial speech also would 
not affect most algorithm-based decisions. It would apply to search engines’ 
(and newspapers’) advertisements, but most search engine results are not 
paid advertisements.93 
A different way of emphasizing individuals would focus on their expression. 
Theories focused on self-expression, for example, emphasize that it is an 
individual’s self-expression that matters, and autonomy-based theories 
similarly emphasize individual autonomy. The problem is that many 
 
90 This is obviously different from the question involved in Citizens United v. FEC, which 
involved limits on the use funds from the general treasuries of corporations. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
91 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) (“[G]iven the existing form of social and economic relationships in the United 
States, a complete denial of first amendment protection for commercial speech is not only 
consistent with, but is required by, first amendment theory.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY 
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 123, 127 (1993) (arguing for little protection of advertising 
because it does not contribute to democratic deliberation). 
92 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980) (“The First Amendment . . . protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental 
regulation.”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (applying First Amend-
ment scrutiny to the regulation of commercial advertisements). 
93 Some early search engines relied heavily on payments in determining what to present and 
where to present it. One of Google’s selling points was that it used page-rank algorithms and that 
what little paid content it had was clearly demarcated as such. Newer search engines have followed 
Google’s lead. Google and its newer competitors realized that they could attract users by 
prioritizing relevant quality websites, and make more money from advertisers relegated to the side 
because of the large number of people who would be attracted by the promise of search results 
containing relevant websites. 
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algorithm-based decisions similarly involve the creator’s self-expression and 
autonomy. Depending on the algorithm, algorithm-based decisions may 
well constitute self-expression, enhance autonomy, and contain meaningful 
thought. The algorithm is simply a means to gather relevant information, 
but the creator chooses what to gather. The person who creates the National 
Debt webpage, or the “God is dead” linkpage, is expressing a view about the 
importance of those topics. Or consider a webpage that uses an algorithm to 
amass links to articles with the words “Obama sucks” or “Romney sucks.” 
These webpages require less curating than does the Drudge Report, but all 
of them reflect autonomous expression. 
Search engines are a closer question, but a definition of self-expression 
that excludes them would be a fairly crabbed one. Start with a search engine 
that focuses on family-friendly material (or, if you prefer, porn). This seems 
to encode autonomous expression—“We value family-friendly material/porn, 
and we want to make it easier for you to find it.” Of course, the creators’ 
actual motivation might be more base—most obviously, “We just want to 
make money.” But that may well be the true motivation for many newspapers 
and magazines, and many artists, for that matter (I’m looking at you, Jeff 
Koons). And because theories of self-expression and individual autonomy 
treat art as squarely within their understanding of speech, those who 
emphasize self-expression or autonomy usually do not focus on the speaker’s 
subjective motivation, but instead on the apparent expression reflected in 
the message. In this case there is an apparent expression, as I noted above. 
It is a very small step from that expression to blekko’s expression. 
Instead of “We value family-friendly material/porn, and we want to make it 
easier for you to find it,” the expression would be “We value quality 
websites, and we want to make it easier for you to find them.” And it is 
then another small step to Google’s expression. As I noted above, Google, 
too, articulates quality as its goal. But even if we credit only its focus on 
relevance, substituting “relevant” for “quality” in the expression does not 
make it any less of an expression. In all cases, the algorithm creators are 
expressing their views about what they value. 
Perhaps Google in particular (and maybe blekko, too) is different, insofar 
as its message is not so much “We value relevant websites” but more like 
“We select for you what you want.” In the latter formulation, Google 
arguably is not expressing its own preferences so much as it is indicating 
that it wants to satisfy ours. 
Differentiating Google for purposes of First Amendment coverage based 
on its catering to users’ interests would be a significant shift in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, as publications and editors that frankly focus on 
their viewers’ or readers’ interests would be unprotected. It has not mattered 
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in the past whether a magazine owner (or cable operator) was merely 
responding to a market opportunity or was expressing its own subjective 
preferences, but now that difference would be dispositive. If we define 
unprotected speech to include speech that responds to public demand, only 
the few publications that push their ideas regardless of public interest94 
would be speakers, and that would upend most First Amendment law. 
Beyond that, this would be a mighty thin reed on which to rest a distinc-
tion. We can recharacterize Google’s position as “Our preference is to select 
for you what we believe you find valuable.” If we substitute “is” for “you 
find,” or change the locution to “we believe you should find valuable,” there 
is clearly expression. So we would be putting an enormous amount of 
weight on the creators’ articulation as focused on what others want. 
Articulating one’s goal in terms of serving others is still an exercise of 
autonomy and a form of self-expression. “What makes you happy makes me 
happy” is an expression of self—one that looks to another for one’s happiness, 
but an expression of personal motivation nonetheless. In the same way, the 
artist who proclaims that she is guided by what her viewers want has still 
made a self-defining and art-defining statement.95 
It also bears noting that decisions about what users want are analogous 
to the decisions of cable operators that the Court found to be speech in 
Turner I. In their briefs, the cable operators stressed that a key consideration 
in choosing what channels to include was what they thought their customers 
wanted.96 Indeed, a major element of the cable operators’ argument that 
there was no sufficient justification for the statute was their assertion that 
cable operators would be guided by viewer interest and thus would air the 
most popular channels whether or not they had an ownership interest in 
them.97 The cable operators, in choosing what channels to air, were engaged 
in editing, on whatever substantive basis they chose, and those editorial 
decisions constituted speech. The cable operators claimed they were editing 
 
94 We usually call these “vanity publications.” 
95 Cf. THE KINKS, GIVE THE PEOPLE WHAT THEY WANT (Arista Records 1981). 
96 See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellants Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. at 19-20, Turner I, 512 U.S. 
622 (1994) (No. 93-44), 1993 WL 664649 (“A cable operator’s very raison d’etre is to choose from 
among the enormous variety of sources of video programming available in order to put together a 
package of programming that will be appealing to television viewers.”); Reply Brief for Appellants 
Discovery Commc’ns, Inc. and the Learning Channel, Inc. at 6, Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (No. 93-
44), 1993 WL 664652 (emphasizing the role of market forces in cable operators’ choices of which 
channels to carry). 
97 Nothing in the Court’s opinion suggests that any aspect of First Amendment coverage 
turned on the degree to which a cable operator chose channels purely on mechanistic measures of 
popularity. 
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in light of their sense of their customers’ wishes, and Google is doing the 
exact same thing.98 
A different tack would entail a focus on the audience. Some Supreme 
Court opinions and some commentators have emphasized the importance of 
listeners and viewers having access to a wide range of views.99 But a “right 
 
98 Tim Wu’s contribution to this Symposium contends that under the Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence the crucial question is whether the alleged speaker adopts the information provided as its 
own. See Wu, supra note 6, at 1530. As I noted above, this distinction is inconsistent with the 
prevailing Supreme Court jurisprudence. Beyond that, it would not exclude all algorithm-based 
outputs from First Amendment coverage. The National Debt billboard, the “God is Dead” webpage, 
and the articles written by the journalist using boilerplate and by Narrative Science all entail adoption 
by their creators. Wu’s focus on functionality would exclude certain categories of substantive editing, 
whether they were produced by humans or algorithms. His emphasis on search engines “merely 
pointing the user to [information]” applies with equal strength to human and nonhuman pointers. So 
a human who manually performs the functions of a search engine or an automated concierge would 
not be engaged in speech. By hypothesis, such a human would not adopt the information provided 
but instead would search for and retrieve it exactly as an algorithm would. Algorithms make such 
nonadoptive retrieval more common, but in Wu’s formulation the line between algorithms and 
non-algorithms is not central to First Amendment coverage. This is an important area of 
agreement between Wu and me: algorithm-based outputs underscore the breadth of the test that 
the Supreme Court has developed, but do not provide a useful line at which to limit that breadth. 
In light of my focus on algorithms, in this Article I do not address the normative attractiveness, 
on their own terms, of proffered lines between speech and nonspeech that do not focus on 
algorithms (e.g., limiting First Amendment coverage to political speech, see supra note 88). Wu’s 
line may well be a desirable one. I would note, though, that the line between adoption and 
pointing is no clearer than other lines in First Amendment coverage, and arguably much less clear. 
Many Web aggregators that would constitute speakers under most every definition of “speech” 
consist of links to webpages without any clear adoption or endorsement. See, e.g., ARTS & 
LETTERS DAILY, http://www.aldaily.com/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); REDDIT, http://www. 
reddit.com/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). On which side of the line do they fall? An individual at 
Arts & Letters Daily chooses the articles to which to link whereas Reddit uses an algorithm based 
on the popularity of a given link, but, as I noted above, nothing in Wu’s focus on adoption turns 
on whether the entity choosing the links is a human or an algorithm created by humans. See Arts & 
Letters Daily, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arts_%26_Letters_Daily (last updated 
Feb. 10, 2013); Reddit, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reddit (last updated Apr. 4, 
2013). And the line between Reddit (which displays the most popular links of the moment at its 
top) and a search on Google for “the most popular links right now” is not obvious. 
99 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (noting that the First 
Amendment affords the public “access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information 
and ideas”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 
(1976) (stating that the “freedom of speech ‘necessarily protects the right to receive’”); Kleindienst 
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (“In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First 
Amendment right to receive information and ideas.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stanley 
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the 
right to receive information and ideas.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) 
(stating that the freedom of speech includes “the right to receive”); see also Thomas I. Emerson, 
Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (“It is clear at the outset that the 
right to know fits readily into the first amendment . . . .”); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972) (arguing that the First Amendment protects listeners’ 
access to information and viewpoints and thereby protects autonomy). 
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to receive information” is articulated as an addition to the rights of speakers, 
as opposed to a substitute for them, and so would not limit the treatment of 
algorithm-based decisions as speech.100 It does bear noting, though, that a 
focus on the rights of the audience might buttress the position of some 
algorithm-based outputs—in particular, search engines. One way of concep-
tualizing the rights of listeners and viewers is as a right to unencumbered 
access to information.101 Such a conceptualization would lend support to the 
treatment of an individual’s search results as part of the information that is 
encompassed by the Free Speech Clause. A different conceptualization 
would interpret the rights of listeners and viewers as justifying government 
regulation of information providers, but application of such arguments to 
exclude information providers from coverage by the Free Speech Clause 
would be a radical change in First Amendment jurisprudence.102 For better 
or worse, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has decisively rejected this 
vision.103 
Yet another direction would focus on the government’s purpose or motive 
in enacting a particular regulation. Some commentators (including then-
professor Elena Kagan) have suggested that First Amendment coverage 
should turn on the government’s purpose or motive, such that an economic 
 
100 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756 (“Freedom of speech presupposes a willing 
speaker. But where a speaker exists, . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to its 
source and to its recipients both.”). 
101 See, e.g., id.; Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670-71 (2011) (“[T]he fear that 
people would make bad decisions if given truthful information cannot justify content-based 
burdens on speech. The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that 
seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) 
(“The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum 
where ideas and information flourish. . . . [T]he general rule is that the speaker and the audience, 
not the government, assess the value of the information presented.”). 
102 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (suggesting that the freedom 
of speech includes “the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, 
moral, and other ideas and experiences”); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First 
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1666 (1967) (“It is to be hoped that an awareness of the 
listener’s interest in broadcasting will lead to an equivalent concern for the reader’s stake in the 
press, and that first amendment recognition will be given to a right of access for the protection of 
the reader, the listener, and the viewer.”). 
103 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 4, 20-21 (1986) (plurality 
opinion) (holding that a state utility commission could not constitutionally compel a private utility 
company to include in its billing envelopes materials produced by an adverse group); Miami 
Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a state statute 
guaranteeing political candidates media access to respond to criticism). Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has largely abandoned its intimation in Red Lion that the First Amendment empowers the 
government to give access rights to listeners and viewers. As it turns out, broadcasting is the only 
area that the Court has treated as justifying a right of access—and even there, the Court has held 
that broadcasters have First Amendment rights (just diminished ones). 
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motive should not trigger First Amendment coverage but a censorious 
motive should.104 Whatever the merits of this approach, and whatever its 
application to algorithm-based outputs, it is inconsistent with a significant 
number of Supreme Court cases that applied the First Amendment despite 
the fact that the underlying regulation had an economic motive.105 
There are of course other theories of the First Amendment, but all 
would either draw arbitrary lines or exclude much that we currently consider 
to be speech. 
B. An Algorithm-Based Line that Works 
As the discussion above indicates, crafting a First Amendment exclusion 
only for algorithm-based decisions would be arbitrary, and crafting a 
nonarbitrary category that excludes algorithm-based decisions would 
exclude much of what we regard as speech and thus significantly change our 
jurisprudence. Because of the similarity of algorithm-based decisions to 
communications that are clearly speech under the prevailing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, there do not appear to be any principled distinctions that 
would leave algorithm-based decisions uncovered without upending signifi-
cant aspects of that jurisprudence. But a different line is tenable and might 
do significant work in the future even if it would not do any at present: 
excluding outputs that do not reflect human decisionmaking. 
A key element of the discussion so far is that there is a human mind 
behind all the algorithms. The fact that an algorithm is involved does not 
mean that a machine is doing the talking. Individuals are sending a substantive 
message in such a way that others can receive it. What happens to the 
analysis, however, if humans are no longer meaningfully creating the 
message? That is, how should we analyze a situation in which artificial 
intelligence has developed to the point that a set of algorithms have freed 
 
104 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (arguing “that First Amendment law, 
as developed by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary, though 
unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First 
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 775-79 (2001) (asserting the centrality of a law’s 
purpose in determining the appropriate application of the First Amendment).  
105 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665 (applying First Amendment scrutiny to a regulation motivated 
by economic considerations and stating that, “[w]hile the burdened speech results from an 
economic motive, so too does a great deal of vital expression”); United States v. United Foods, 
Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 408, 417 (2001) (applying First Amendment scrutiny to an agricultural 
assessment requirement on the grounds that it compelled mushroom handlers to fund speech with 
which they disagreed); Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994) (applying First Amendment scrutiny to 
legislation while also finding that “Congress’ overriding objective in enacting [a law requiring 
cable carriage of local television broadcasters] was . . . to preserve access to free television 
programming for the 40 percent of Americans without cable”). 
2013] Algorithms and Speech 1479 
 
themselves from human direction such that the product of the algorithms 
does not reflect human decisionmaking about what to communicate? 
Computer scientists have developed programs that engage in massive 
data analysis that would take humans eons to complete, but those programs 
do not develop the models and analyses on their own. Compilers change 
programs from high-level to low-level languages (e.g., Java to assembly code), 
but those compilers are not exercising any independent judgment in doing so. 
Some programs use random variation as a means of experimentation and 
possible adaptation. For instance, some programs use not only formulas but 
also some prescribed points of randomness to allow the computer program 
to produce a range of outcomes. A particularly enjoyable example is The 
Nietzsche Family Circus, a webpage which, with each hit of the “refresh” 
button, pairs a randomized Family Circus cartoon with a randomized 
Friedrich Nietzsche quote.106 Whatever meaning we find in this randomized 
process and its results is due to the program’s clever (human) designer and 
our reactions to that design. After all, the same effect could be achieved (à 
la John Cage) by throwing grains of rice emblazoned (in very tiny letters) 
with Nietzsche quotations into the air above a checkerboard of Family Circus 
cartoons. There would likely be all sorts of interesting pairings, but we 
wouldn’t attribute any agency in generating a message to the grains of rice. 
A bit closer to home, programmers have created programs that generate 
random papers, at least one of which was accepted at a recent conference.107 
But the random processes are not crafting substantive messages.108 Humans 
are crafting messages about academic standards and are employing randomness 
to do so. As the webpage of the Postmodernism Generator (which “creates 
realistic-looking but meaningless academic papers about postmodernism, 
poststructuralism and similar subjects”) notes, “The papers produced are 
perfectly grammatically correct and read as if written by a human being; 
 
106 See NIETZSCHE FAMILY CIRCUS, http://www.losanjealous.com/nfc (last visited Apr. 10, 
2013). 
107 See, e.g., SCIGEN—AN AUTOMATIC CS PAPER GENERATOR, http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/ 
scigen/#relwork (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (“SCIgen is a program that generates random Computer 
Science research papers, including graphs, figures, and citations. It uses a hand-written context-free 
grammar to form all elements of the papers. Our aim here is to maximize amusement, rather than 
coherence.” (emphasis omitted)); timothy, Randomly Generated Paper Accepted to Conference, 
SLASHDOT (Apr. 13, 2005, 2:00 PM), http://entertainment.slashdot.org/story/05/04/13/1723206/ 
randomly-generated-paper-accepted-to-conference (“Some students at MIT wrote a program called 
SCIgen . . . [and] one of their randomly generated paper[s] was accepted to [the 2005 World 
Multiconference on Systemics, Cybernetics, and Informatics]. Now they are accepting donation[s] to 
fund their trip to the conference and give a randomly generated talk.” (emphasis omitted)). 
108 The whole point is that humans are prone to find messages and meaning even in random 
collections of words and numbers. 
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any meaning found in them, however, is purely coincidental.”109 That is the 
substantive message, and it derives from decisions made by the human 
designers. The programs are fun precisely because we may ascribe meaning 
even to the result of random processes, whether random words or random 
raindrops on the pavement. Those raindrops have not in fact sent us a 
substantive message; we just choose to read something into the random 
picture they create. 
Other programs use randomness for purposes of experimentation and 
adaptation toward a prescribed goal. Programmers have, for example, 
created programs that break into multiple offshoots, each of which has some 
decision points at which randomness comes into play and thus produces 
different outcomes. The program itself (or the programmer) then determines 
which of these permutations comes closest to achieving a prescribed goal 
(modeling past stock movements and predicting future stock movements 
are popular), and there can be multiple generations of such permutations, 
resulting in unguided adaptation toward a goal. This is also how some 
computer viruses work: they are programmed to use randomness at key 
points (often in response to the host program’s defenses), in the hope that 
some versions of the virus will become more effective at propagating and 
achieving the programmer’s goal. This is different from random raindrops 
on the pavement, because once we see what adaptation best achieves our 
goal (e.g., “add yesterday’s closing price of Wal-Mart’s stock to the previous 
day’s rainfall in Seattle and divide by the previous night’s number of 
viewers of the PBS NewsHour”), we can replicate its pattern. But the 
adaptation is not communicating a substantive message. We find the 
adaptation useful because it happens to move us toward a goal that we have 
chosen. We are supplying the volition and all the meaning.110 
 
109 POSTMODERNISM GENERATOR, http://page112.com/iphone/pomo/ (last visited Apr. 10, 
2013). The creators of The Postmodern Generator added the elegantly understated caveat that 
“submitting generated texts to journals or academic courses is not recommended.” Id. 
This is different from the process used by Narrative Science, see supra notes 71-73 and accom-
panying text, because Narrative Science does try to communicate substantive messages with its 
choice of words, just as a human author does. Just as a writer (or law professor) who cuts and 
pastes boilerplate into her article does so in order to communicate a substantive message (just one 
that can be communicated via off-the-shelf language), so too Narrative Science utilizes its 
boilerplate in order to communicate information. 
110 To put the matter a bit differently, telling the world that this formula, or the price of tea 
in China, predicts the stock market’s movements is a form of substantive communication. But that 
fact does not mean that the formula, or the price of tea in China, is independently communicating 
anything. 
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That said, artificial intelligence could cross, or at least blur, this line.111 
Imagine that artificial intelligence advances to such a level that machines are 
in some meaningful sense choosing their own goals and what substantive 
communications will achieve those goals. Just as a machine may at some 
point satisfy the Turing test,112 it may at some point demonstrate a level of 
choice or volition that is indistinguishable from that of humans. At that 
point, we might say that the connection to the human creators is sufficiently 
attenuated that the results no longer reflect humans’ decisions about how to 
determine what to produce, such that there is no longer a human sending a 
substantive message. No human would be communicating anything. 
Extending the First Amendment to messages produced by this artificial 
intelligence would raise the specter that may underlie Tim Wu’s concerns: 
we would be treating the products of machines like those of human 
minds.113 We could then say that “speech” was truly created (and not just 
transmitted, or aided) by a machine.114 
V. SCOPE 
Does this mean that heightened scrutiny will apply to almost every 
regulation of entities that produce words via algorithm? No. Two hurdles to 
First Amendment coverage are particularly significant. First, the algorithm 
must send a substantive message. Algorithms that are designed to speed 
transmission, or make a network operate more efficiently, are not sending 
any substantive message. Your landline telephone (remember those?) might 
work better if the telephone company installed algorithms that reduce 
background noise, but the telephone company has not substantively 
 
111 See, e.g., SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONO-
MOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS (2011) (extending legal principles to the unique challenges posed by 
the evolution and increasing sophistication of artificial agents).  
112 On the Turing test, see David Dowe & Graham Oppy, The Turing Test, STANFORD 
ENCYCL. OF PHIL. ( J an. 26, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-test (noting that a 
machine passes the Turing Test when a person is unable to detect that she is conversing with a 
machine instead of a fellow person). On the legal implications of machines capable of meeting the 
Turing standard, see generally JAMES BOYLE, BROOKINGS INST., ENDOWED BY THEIR 
CREATOR? THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD 6 (2011), available at http:// 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/3/09%20personhood%20boyle/0309_person
hood_boyle (“In the coming century, it is overwhelmingly likely that constitutional law will have 
to classify artificially created entities that have some but not all of the attributes we associate with 
human beings.”). 
113 See Wu, supra note 18.  
114 Of course, this assumes we would regard such machines as materially different from 
humans in the first place. As James Boyle has noted, our grandchildren might view such machines 
as rightfully entitled to all the protections of personhood. See BOYLE, supra note 112. But I leave 
that scenario for another day. 
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communicated anything by doing so.115 Second, laws of general applicability 
like antitrust and tax laws are treated as laws that do not abridge the 
freedom of speech and thus do not implicate the First Amendment.116 
Paying income taxes may well limit the ability of a speaker (algorithm-
based or not) to communicate as she wishes, but such a limitation is not 
covered by the Free Speech Clause. One could reject either of these 
limitations, but such a rejection would constitute a significant remaking of 
First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Each of these axes of limitation can and should extend further. As I noted 
above, my view is that the mere existence of substantive editing is not 
sufficient for status as speech under the Free Speech Clause. A substantive 
communication entails a message that can be sent and received, and that has 
been sent.117 And not only should generally applicable laws be exempt from 
First Amendment scrutiny, but so too should laws aimed more specifically 
at speakers that do not regulate their speech. 
Both of these interpretations of the scope of the First Amendment are 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence but arguably not 
compelled by it. Their adoption would also have the effect of reducing the 
potential universe of situations in which heightened scrutiny under the Free 
Speech Clause would apply, and thus alleviating the concerns of those who 
think that the First Amendment has been applied too broadly. To be clear, I 
 
115 See Benjamin, supra note 8, at 1686. 
116 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (“[G]enerally applicable laws 
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”). The Supreme Court has invoked 
this principle in a long line of antitrust cases. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. Some have 
argued that Cowles Media’s statement sweeps too broadly. See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 676-77 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]his case does not fall within the line of authority holding the press to 
laws of general applicability where commercial activities and relationships, not the content of 
publication, are at issue.”); Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 35 GA. 
L. REV. 1087, 1095 (2001) (“[T]he fact that a law is generally applicable does not necessarily mean 
there is no need for further First Amendment analysis.”); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: 
Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted 
Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1294 (2005) (distinguishing “a facially speech-neutral law, which 
is to say a law applicable to a wide variety of conduct, whether speech or not,” from “a facially 
press-neutral law, which is to say a law applicable equally to the press and to others,” and stating 
that the language from the Cowles Media majority opinion quoted above “only means that the 
press gets no special exemption from press-neutral laws. The Court didn’t consider whether 
speakers were entitled to protection from speech-neutral laws, especially when those laws are 
content-based as applied”). None of these critics argues, however, that generally applicable laws 
not aimed at content, such as antitrust and tax laws, should in fact be subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny. See Garfield, supra, at 1094 (“[O]ne can hardly disagree . . . that the press is not exempt 
from laws of general applicability. Surely the First Amendment does not immunize the press from 
obeying fire safety laws in its buildings or from having its delivery trucks obey the speed limits.”); 
Volokh, supra, at 1294. 
117 See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text; see also Benjamin, supra note 8, at 1701. 
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think these are the best readings of the materials and thus would adopt 
them whether or not they limited the scope of the Free Speech Clause. But 
insofar as that scope is a concern, these interpretations diminish those 
concerns to some degree. 
I offer these two interpretations because I think they are sound in their 
own right and consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence. Both limit the 
breadth of what “the freedom of speech” might encompass without changing 
First Amendment jurisprudence. If one’s goal were to limit the impact of 
the Free Speech Clause on the government’s ability to regulate, there are 
other proposals one could advocate—for example, lowering the level of 
scrutiny entailed in the tests that courts apply to regulations of speech. I do 
not suggest such changes both because limiting the government’s ability to 
regulate is not my goal and because I am focusing here on interpretations of 
the scope of the Free Speech Clause that are fully consistent with the 
existing Supreme Court jurisprudence. My point is that without having to 
change the prevailing approach, the Free Speech Clause can and should be 
interpreted in ways that limit its scope. 
A. Requiring Communicating About Your Editing 
The criteria I laid out above include that a message is sendable and 
receivable, and is actually sent. If you attribute your own private meaning 
to some action and communicate that meaning to no one, I find it hard to 
say that you have engaged in speech. In some situations the underlying 
communication is so clear that the speaker does not need to do anything 
special to alert listeners or viewers. Newspapers generally do not proclaim 
“This newspaper is the product of our writing and editing,” because that is 
simply understood by the reading public. In other situations, the relevant 
action is fairly clearly not speech, so alerting the audience will not trans-
mogrify that action into speech. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that the fact that conduct 
would be expressive only if accompanied by speech identifying its expression 
was itself an indicator that the conduct was not speech.118 
The question is whether there are situations in which communicating 
about the underlying activity is necessary for it to be speech. I think the 
answer is yes. In most situations it will be obvious, but not always; and 
 
118 See 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (“The expressive component of a law school’s actions is not 
created by the conduct itself but by the speech that accompanies it. The fact that such explanatory 
speech is necessary is strong evidence that the conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive 
that it warrants protection under [United States v.] O’Brien [391 U.S. 369 (1968)].”). 
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when it is not obvious, failing to communicate means that the recipient does 
not know that a message has been sent. 
Consider some forms of art, for example. A pile of mud is art, and thus 
speech, only when it is so presented (e.g., in an art gallery). A pile of candy 
on the floor becomes artistic communication only when it is identified as the 
communication of an artist.119 Maybe, however, all this shows is that art is 
contextual. 
Perhaps a more apt real-world comparison is to a secretly edited bulletin 
board (virtual or otherwise). Consider a webpage open to comments that 
are, to all appearances, unedited. There is no suggestion on the part of the 
website that it moderates or edits these comments in any way, and the 
number and range of tasteless, offensive comments would support the 
impression that there is no ongoing moderating or editing. Unbeknownst to 
all but the few commenters who are censored (and whose complaints are 
then censored), the webpage owners secretly engage in substantive editing 
of the comments—maybe they remove posts that are too tasteful, or that 
support the Socialist Workers Party. The commenters are certainly engaged 
in speech for First Amendment purposes, but does the webpage owners’ 
editing constitute speech? I think the answer is no, because the owners have 
not indicated to their users that they are engaged in substantive editing. 
The users’ reading experience has been altered by the webpage owners, but 
the users have not received a recognizable message. The webpage owners 
are speaking in a language that sounds like meaningless noise to the users, 
and the owners are not revealing that it is, in fact, a language but are instead 
keeping it a secret. By keeping their editing secret, they are not sending any 
messages. Simply stated, the webpage owners would not have communicated 
to their users. 
That said, I acknowledge that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does 
not compel this conclusion. The Court’s cases do indicate that a substantive 
message is necessary, but no case similarly clarifies that it is necessary to 
alert the world to the existence of your substantive message in situations 
where that message is not obvious. Indeed, Turner I highlights that public 
affirmations of editing often will not be required. In that case, nothing in 
the Court’s opinion indicates that public pronouncements by cable operators 
were necessary or even relevant. The Court apparently treated the operators’ 
editing—the fact that they chose what channels to put in their lineups—as 
sufficiently obvious that public statements by the cable operators were not 
 
119 One of Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s “signature works” was “Untitled (Placebo—Landscape—
for Roni),” which consisted of hard candy wrapped in cellophane on a concrete floor. See Cate 
McQuaid, Sweet but Not Sugarcoated, BOSTON.COM (Dec. 13, 2007) http://www.boston.com/ae/ 
theater_arts/articles/2007/12/13/sweet_but_not_sugarcoated.  
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necessary. There is no Supreme Court case in which the activity giving rise 
to a message was sufficiently nonobvious that speech acknowledging that 
activity would have been necessary to put the audience on notice. In my 
view, this is the most coherent understanding of “communication.” A concern 
about First Amendment overexpansion would further support this view. 
This question will be purely academic for many algorithm-based deci-
sions, both because the editors’ work will be obvious and because they will 
acknowledge it. Web users understand, for example, that search engines are 
not simply presenting them with “the Internet” but are instead using algo-
rithms in order to find the most relevant or highest quality sites in response 
to their queries. And, as I noted above, the search engines themselves so 
state.120 Similarly, most websites do engage in some screening (algorithm-
based, proactive by humans, and/or in response to complaints by humans) 
of user-submitted material, and communicate that to the world.121 
Conversely, most algorithms that affect our experience of the Internet more 
broadly (like TCP/IP) are designed not to engage in any substantive editing 
in the first place and do not send any substantive messages. 
But there may be situations in which algorithm-based substantive editing 
is not obvious and the editor keeps it a secret, or sends mixed messages that 
create doubt. Internet service providers advertise their services as offering 
the Internet, as opposed to a substantively edited portion of the Internet. 
But imagine that an Internet service provider engages in substantive editing 
that would not be obvious and does not communicate that editing to users 
(say, blocking some webpages that extol the virtues of Falun Gong). Users 
would find fewer positive sources about Falun Gong on the Web than 
actually existed, and this might influence their views about Falun Gong 
(which presumably would be the reason for editing in the first place), but 
they would not know that their ISP had engaged in such editing. Their ISP 
would not have sent them any readily understandable message. 
What would be required of the hypothetical ISP? The message must be 
both sendable and sent, but I do not think it is necessary that the message 
be received. There is obviously no magic formula. And the articulation 
could depend on how concerned one was about the breadth of the First 
Amendment’s application in the first place. My own view, based on what I 
think of as a bare-bones understanding of what communication entails, is 
that the touchstone would be that the speaker had meaningfully attempted to 
 
120 See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text. 
121 Even seemingly anarchic Internet communities like 4chan have moderators (and junior 
moderators, known on 4chan as “janitors”) whose role is made clear on the website. FAQ: What 
Are “Janitors”?, 4CHAN, http://www.4chan.org/faq#whojan (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).  
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communicate its message to the world, and in particular to its audience.122 
There are many different forms of communication—formal advertising, 
news releases, statements by company officials, blog posts, tweets. A memo 
that was written and then deleted would not suffice, as there would have 
been no attempt at communication, but a clear public message would seem 
to suffice, even if the company did not trumpet it. In an earlier era, identi-
fying a clear public message might have been difficult sometimes. Before 
the Internet, perhaps a single advertisement in a given city would have had 
no meaningful chance of being disseminated more broadly and thus would 
not really have been a message sent to the world. But in the Internet era, 
for better or worse this difficulty largely evaporates: any tweet, blog post, or 
statement by a company official that presents a company’s new position is 
subject to widespread dissemination via the Web. An entity’s public 
declaration of its policy thus would, in ordinary circumstances, constitute a 
meaningful attempt to communicate. 
The bigger pitfall would involve mixed messages. If one arm of a com-
pany proclaims “We edit your experience” and another arm equally loudly 
proclaims “We don’t do any editing,” then no meaningful message has been 
communicated. Such incoherence is more likely if a company changes its 
position, because articulations of the company’s earlier position are likely to 
remain on the Web. A change in position may impose a greater burden on 
an entity, because the entity will have to do more in order to communicate 
its message. The principle is fairly straightforward: in order to engage in 
speech, one must actually send a substantive message, and the level of 
action required to send a message may depend on the surrounding circum-
stances—other statements the entity has made, a contrary reputation that it 
may have cultivated, etc. 
The larger point, though, is that the argument for this requirement 
could be strengthened, and indeed the nature of the requirement could be 
toughened, if one wanted to limit the expansiveness of the First Amend-
ment’s coverage. Even absent a goal of reining in the application of the 
First Amendment, in my view the reading outlined above is the most 
persuasive and coherent understanding of what a communication entails. 
But such a goal would be furthered by adoption of this requirement. 
 
122 See Benjamin, supra note 8, at 1701 (explaining that communication requires a substantive 
message that can be sent and received and has actually been sent). 
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B. Regulations of Speakers Not 
Aimed at Their Speech 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that laws of general applica-
bility, like antitrust laws, can be applied to speakers without implicating the 
First Amendment.123 That said, there are a couple of exceptions. Under 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,124 antitrust 
enforcement against actions aimed at changing regulations would implicate 
the First Amendment. And politically motivated boycotts are covered by 
the First Amendment under NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.125 Noerr 
construed the Sherman Act not to apply to conduct aimed at “influencing 
the passage or enforcement of laws” in light of the constitutional problems 
with a contrary construction—that regulation of such conduct would 
conflict with the First Amendment right to petition the government.126 
 
123 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945) (applying generally appli-
cable antitrust laws to a company’s core First Amendment activities); id. at 7 (“The fact that the 
publisher handles news while others handle food does not . . . afford the publisher a peculiar 
constitutional sanctuary in which he can with impunity violate laws regulating his business 
practices.”); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 156 (1951) (“Injunctive relief under 
. . . the Sherman Act is as appropriate a means of enforcing the Act against newspapers as it is 
against others.”); see also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 n.18 (1978) 
(“[A]pplication of the antitrust laws to newspapers is not only consistent with, but is actually 
supportive of the values underlying, the First Amendment.”). This also extends to remedies. See 
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98 (1978) (“In fashioning a 
remedy, the District Court may, of course, consider the fact that its injunction may impinge upon 
rights that would otherwise be constitutionally protected, but those protections do not prevent it 
from remedying the antitrust violations.”) 
124 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
125 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982) (“[B]oycott[s] [are] a form of speech or conduct . . . ordinarily 
entitled to protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
126 See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38 (“To hold that the government retains the power to act in 
this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform 
the government of their wishes . . . would raise important constitutional questions. The right of 
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly 
impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.”); see also id. at 139 (“A construction of the 
Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking a public position on matters in which they 
are financially interested would thus deprive the government of a valuable source of information 
and, at the same time, deprive the people of their right to petition in the very instances in which 
that right may be of the most importance to them.”). The Court reiterated this interpretation of 
the Sherman Act in light of the speech principles at stake in United Mine Workers of America v. 
Pennington. See 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (“Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort 
to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose.”); see also Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972) (“We conclude that it would be destructive of 
rights of association and of petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without 
violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and 
courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and 
economic interests vis-à-vis their competitors.”). In Allied Tube and Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 
Inc., the Court summarized the doctrine by stating flatly that “[c]oncerted efforts to restrain or 
monopolize trade by petitioning government officials are protected from antitrust liability under 
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Claiborne Hardware, meanwhile, emphasized that the challenged action (a 
boycott of white merchants by the NAACP in Mississippi during the civil 
rights movement) “sought to bring about political, social, and economic 
change. Through speech, assembly, and petition—rather than through riot 
or revolution—petitioners sought to change a social order that had consist-
ently treated them as second-class citizens.”127 
Both of these categories of First Amendment applicability have been 
construed fairly narrowly to apply only to coordinated actions aimed 
directly at influencing government action.128 FTC v. Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers Ass’n is instructive.129 The case involved a group of court-appointed 
lawyers who objected to the low level of compensation in Washington, DC, 
criminal cases and organized a boycott aimed at increasing that compensa-
tion.130 After the Federal Trade Commission initiated an antitrust action 
against the lawyers’ group, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
concluded that the boycott “contain[ed] an element of expression warrant-
ing First Amendment protection” and applied heightened scrutiny.131 The 
Supreme Court rejected this notion, and further emphasized that Noerr had 
found the First Amendment relevant in an antitrust action against a publicity 
campaign designed to produce government action, not an antitrust action 
against a restraint of trade.132 The Court also stressed the narrowness of 
Claiborne Hardware, holding that First Amendment coverage for political 
boycotts was “not applicable to a boycott conducted by business competitors 
who ‘stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the 
boycotted market.’”133 
 
the doctrine established by Noerr; Pennington; and California Motor Transport Co.” 486 U.S. 492, 
499 (1988). 
127 458 U.S. at 911-12. 
128 See, e.g., Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144 (“There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, 
ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is 
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.”). 
129 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
130 Id. at 414-18. 
131 856 F.2d 226, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d in part, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
132 Specifically, the Court stated: 
[I]n the Noerr case the alleged restraint of trade was the intended consequence of public 
action; in this case the boycott was the means by which respondents sought to obtain 
favorable legislation. The restraint of trade that was implemented while the boycott 
lasted would have had precisely the same anticompetitive consequences during that 
period even if no legislation had been enacted.  
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 424-25. 
133 Id. at 426-27 (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 
508 (1988)). Allied Tube similarly distinguished politically motivated from profit-motivated 
boycotts, and held that only the former trigger First Amendment scrutiny. 486 U.S. at 506-10. 
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One unsettled question is whether the First Amendment encompasses 
laws that single out speakers (and thus are not generally applicable) but do 
not regulate their speech. In Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, the 
Supreme Court suggested that any law singling out a set of speakers for 
special treatment was subject to First Amendment scrutiny.134 By contrast, 
in Leathers v. Medlock the Court held that First Amendment review applies 
only to differential taxation schemes that threaten to suppress the expres-
sion of particular ideas or viewpoints, target a small group of speakers, or 
discriminate based on the content of speech.135 Leathers stated that “differ-
ential taxation of speakers, even members of the press, does not implicate 
the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of 
suppressing, particular ideas.”136 
What about the application of the First Amendment to a regulation 
whose only connection to speech was that it applied to an entity that 
engages in speech? The D.C. Circuit has treated all regulations of cable 
operators as raising First Amendment issues. Some of these regulations 
directly relate to cable operators’ speech.137 Requiring cable operators to set 
aside some of their capacity for public, educational, and governmental 
channels, and for stations subject to leased access, for instance, could reduce 
the number of channels over which cable operators can exercise editorial 
control and thus limit their ability to engage in speech under the First 
Amendment.138 Other regulations that the D.C. Circuit has subjected to 
First Amendment scrutiny, however, have no direct connection to cable 
operators’ editing. The best example is the regulation of the rates that cable 
 
The Court distinguished Claiborne Hardware by emphasizing that the civil rights boycott in 
Claiborne Hardware “was not motivated by any desire to lessen competition or to reap economic 
benefits . . . and the boycotters were consumers who did not stand to profit financially from a 
lessening of competition in the boycotted market.” Id. at 508. 
134 See 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987) (“[S]elective taxation of the press—either singling out the 
press as a whole or targeting individual members of the press—poses a particular danger of abuse 
by the state.”); see also Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) (“[L]aws that single out the press, or 
certain elements thereof, for special treatment . . . are always subject to at least some degree of 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
135 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991). 
136 Id. at 453. 
137 One example is vertical concentration limits on cable operators, which limit the percentage 
of channels in which an operator has an ownership interest that it can include in its lineup, thus 
constraining the operator’s choice of which channels to air. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B) (2006) 
(mandating that the FCC “establish[] reasonable limits on the number of channels on a cable 
system that can be occupied by a video programmer in which a cable operator has an attributable 
interest”); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1137-39 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying 
First Amendment scrutiny to rules promulgated under § 533(f)(1)(B)). 
138 See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that 
such regulation could present First Amendment problems, but rejecting a facial challenge to the 
statute at issue). 
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companies can charge to their customers. The D.C. Circuit, with little 
discussion, held that such regulation is subject to First Amendment scrutiny.139 
The nexus between rate regulation and cable operators’ exercise of editorial 
discretion is not obvious. One could argue that rate regulation reduces 
revenues, which limits the ability of a cable operator to produce the content 
it wants and to exercise editorial discretion as it sees fit.140 But this argu-
ment would suggest that virtually every regulation that specifically applies 
to a company engaged in speech will be subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny, because almost any regulation can have the effect of reducing 
revenue. 
The Supreme Court has not considered cases involving the rate regulation 
of cable television service or other regulations that have similarly tenuous 
connections to speech.141 That is, every regulation to which the Court has 
applied First Amendment scrutiny has had some additional element 
connecting it to speech, and thus the Court has never considered the 
applicability of the First Amendment to a regulation whose only connection 
to speech was that it was not of general applicability and applied to an 
entity that engaged in speech. 
Whereas excluding algorithm-based decisions (or even just search 
engines) from the ambit of the First Amendment would entail a significant 
revamping of First Amendment jurisprudence, rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s 
position would have no such effect. It is about as discrete and separable a 
 
139 See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (addressing 
the First Amendment’s application in a single sentence). 
140 See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 687 
(2005) (contending that “rate regulation had the unintended consequence of degrading the quality of 
existing cable offerings and foreclosing the emergence of higher quality channel packages despite 
viewers’ willingness to pay for them”). 
141 The Supreme Court has invalidated statutes giving local officials authority to permit or 
ban distribution of newspapers and other forms of speech, but those cases focused on the 
possibility of content and viewpoint discrimination created by unbridled discretion to permit or 
ban. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 767-68 (1988) (“[T]his Court 
has long been sensitive to the special dangers inherent in a law placing unbridled discretion 
directly to license speech, or conduct commonly associated with speech, in the hands of a 
government official.”); see also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (“When a city allows an 
official to ban [loud-speakers] in his uncontrolled discretion, it sanctions a device for suppression 
of free communication of ideas.”); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (invalidat-
ing a regulation prohibiting the distribution of leaflets without the approval of the city manager). 
Indeed, in Plain Dealer the Court stated, 
This is not to say that the press or a speaker may challenge as censorship any law in-
volving discretion to which it is subject. The law must have a close enough nexus to 
expression, or to conduct commonly associated with expression, to pose a real and 
substantial threat of the identified censorship risks. 
486 U.S. at 759. 
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question as arises in the First Amendment context. The Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence permits either answer: the logic of the cases simply does not 
dictate, or even strongly hint at, an answer to this question. And, for the 
reasons I discussed at the outset, textual and historical interpretive tools do 
not provide an answer.142  
In other words, with respect to generic regulations of speakers—that is, 
regulations that are not directly connected to the conduct giving rise to 
speech and that betray no censorious goals, no preference for content, and 
no desire to squelch particular speakers—there seem to be no broadly 
accepted sources or reasoning that push us strongly in one direction or 
another. As a result, in my view this is an appropriate place for other 
considerations to play a role. I incline toward consequentialism, and I think 
there are good consequentialist reasons related to the concerns about 
heightened scrutiny applying too broadly for rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s 
position. Given the rise of substantive editing (happening all the more 
frequently via algorithms, but of course not limited to algorithms), applying 
the First Amendment to all specific regulations of companies engaged in 
such editing would have a massive impact. One could reject the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach on other bases of course. Under conceptions focusing on 
autonomy and self-expression, for example, it would be risible for a court to 
apply the First Amendment to economic regulation of companies engaged 
in speech. My point is simply that insofar as we are concerned about First 
Amendment scrutiny applying too broadly, this is an appropriate point of 
limitation. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article I have attempted to take seriously both broadly accepted 
sources and forms of reasoning and concerns about expansion of the applica-
tion of the First Amendment. Consistent with that focus, I have considered 
how those broadly accepted sources (in particular Supreme Court jurispru-
dence) would apply to First Amendment coverage of algorithm-based 
decisions, whether we can exclude such decisions from the First Amendment 
without radically revamping First Amendment jurisprudence, and whether 
there are attractive interpretations of the First Amendment’s scope consistent 
with current jurisprudence that would limit its feared overexpansion. 
Those worried about the Free Speech Clause expanding too far, parti-
cularly with respect to algorithm-based decisionmaking (or maybe just 
 
142 Other than, perhaps, the possible originalist conclusion that our entire First Amendment 
jurisprudence is misbegotten because the freedom of speech is only a freedom from prior 
restraints. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
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Google), might find the proposals in the previous Part unsatisfying. If 
drawing nonarbitrary lines that do not radically reorient First Amendment 
jurisprudence provides protections for algorithm-based outputs, then 
perhaps we should be willing to draw arbitrary lines or radically reorient 
First Amendment jurisprudence. 
There is no way to definitively refute these arguments. Perhaps inclusion 
of algorithm-based decisions illuminates just how far Free Speech jurispru-
dence has gone off the rails (to use a technical term), such that we need to 
remake it. Or perhaps algorithm-based decisions are such unattractive 
candidates for First Amendment inclusion that we should draw a somewhat 
arbitrary line excluding them. 
In my view, any line between algorithm-based and human-based decisions 
would be unjustifiably arbitrary, so a radical reorientation is the more 
attractive of the two options in this context.143 But that does not answer the 
 
143 Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides a point of comparison. Even after United States 
v. Lopez, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Congress’s interstate commerce power has been so 
expansive that almost every imaginable piece of federal legislation is authorized by the commerce 
power. See 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (refusing to hold that “the possession of a gun in a local school 
zone” reflects economic activity that rises to the level of interstate commerce and thus implicates 
the commerce power); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding a federal 
statutory remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence unconstitutional because it did not 
comport with the Commerce Clause). Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the Federal Controlled Substances Act as applied to intrastate, noncommercial 
cultivation and possession of marijuana under the Commerce Clause). Some of those concerned 
about this development (notably Justice Thomas) have argued for a radical reorientation of the 
Court’s jurisprudence. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Court “ought to temper [its] Commerce Clause jurisprudence”); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court’s “view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no 
limits” and advocating for a shift to a “standard more consistent with the original understanding”). 
Others have argued for drawing ad hoc, and arguably arbitrary, lines to limit the expansion of that 
power. Both of these positions were articulated (minus any concession of possible arbitrariness) in 
arguments against the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. Some advocates argued for a 
radical revamping of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Brief for Virginia Delegate Bob 
Marshall et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11-14, Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 484059 (Feb. 13, 2012) (arguing for 
a reconsideration of the Court’s Commerce Clause cases, particularly Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111 (1942), and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)). Many more pushed for a distinction 
between activity and inactivity. They often acknowledged that the distinction was ad hoc, and that 
they preferred a more fundamental rethinking of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. But they saw 
the action–inaction distinction as a tenable way of limiting Commerce Clause expansion without 
entailing a radical reorientation of the jurisprudence. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering 
the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 581, 619 (2010) (“Of course, like the distinction between economic and noneconomic 
activity, the activity–inactivity distinction would not perfectly distinguish between incidental and 
remote exercises of implied powers. But, however imperfect, some such line must be drawn to 
preserve Article I’s scheme of limited and enumerated powers.”). Whatever the merits of that 
argument in the Commerce Clause context, I think drawing a line between algorithm-based and 
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question whether a major revamping of First Amendment jurisprudence is 
in fact desirable, and none of the arguments in this Article squarely 
addresses that question. The analysis in this Article does, however, high-
light the stakes involved (because of the growing importance of algorithms 
in our lives), and in that way may provide a boost to arguments for a radical 
reorientation of the existing jurisprudence. That said, it would be a fairly 
small boost. Encompassing algorithm-based decisions within the ambit of 
the Free Speech Clause is a natural and modest step. The profusion of 
computer algorithms designed by humans to do the work other humans 
once did may alter our economy,144 but it does not significantly change the 
First Amendment analysis. So long as humans are making substantive 
editorial decisions, inserting computers into the process does not eliminate 
the communication via that editing.145 Arguments for a radical revamping 
should stand or fall on other grounds. 
 
human-based decisions for purposes of First Amendment coverage is so arbitrary as to be 
undesirable. 
144 See, e.g., ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: 
HOW THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IS ACCELERATING INNOVATION, DRIVING PRODUCTIVITY, 
AND IRREVERSIBLY TRANSFORMING EMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY (2011) (arguing that 
innovations in information technology will, inter alia, destroy many jobs). 
145 Or so our computer overlords would have us believe. See Jeopardy! (ABC television broadcast 
Feb. 15, 2011) (documenting the reaction of Ken Jennings, the most successful Jeopardy! player of all 
time, upon realizing that he was going to lose to an IBM computer named Watson). In his final 
answer, Jennings paraphrased the venerable Simpsons: “I for one welcome our new computer 
overlords.” Id.; see also Melissa Maerz, Watson Wins “Jeopardy!” Finale; Ken Jennings Welcomes “Our 
New Computer Overlords,” L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/showtracker/ 
2011/02/watson-jeopardy-finale-man-vs-machineshowdown.html; Ratzule, Watson the New Computer 
Overlord, YOUTUBE (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Skfw282fJak (video of 
Jennings’s answer and Watson’s victory). 
